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12Notations
The notatioas used throughout this thesis are defined in the text where tbey appear
the first time. Here, we give a list of notations that are often used, for easy reference.
JV Set of nodes 34
J4 Set of arcs 34
T Set of tariff arcs 34
F Set of fixed cost arcs 34
G Directed graph with nodes JV and arcs /t 34
if Set of clients 34
dl, Demand of client it € A' 34
a* Source node of demand for client fc € AT 34
tfc Target node of demand for client Jfc € A' 34
ft Set of all possible paths from .s* to <* for Jfc € A' 34
Tp Set of all tariff arcs on a path p € P/t 34
,Fp Set of all fixed cost arcs on a path p € P/t 34
ia(d) Cost of routing a demand d on an arc aEf 34
Po(d) Pricing strategy' for a demand dona tariff arc a € T 34
7Tp(d) Revenue for a path p and a demand d 34
7p(d) Fixed cost for a path p for a demand d 34
Ap(d) Length of a path p for a demand d (A,,(d) = 7,,(d) + Tp(d)). . . . 34
Ufc Shortest path from s* to <* with highest total fixed cowl 36
/fc Shortest path from a* to t* with lowest total fixed cost 36
U/t(d) Upper bound on revenue for a client fc with a demand d 36
u,j Shortest path from i to j in G with highest total fixed cost. ... 43
iy Shortest path from t to j in G with lowest total fixed cost. ... 43
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Until recently, due to the monopolistic nature of the telecommunication BMriMtt In
the European Union and the United States of America, a client did not haw n choice
of operator for his national or international communications. Fbr his national com-
munications he was restricted to the operator of his own country or state. That same
state monopoly transmitted his international communications to the operator in the
destination state. The prices the different state monopolies (Inured for transmitting
their clients' communications were not determined by free market principles.
Both in the United States and the European Union, several laws (*<•<• KU Directive
[27] and US Act [62]) aimed for the deregularisation of national telecommunication
markets. With the opening of the national markets for foreign operators and the
advent of mobile telephony, the rules of the game changed drastically. The number
of operators in each country has increased significantly. A client now has a choice
of operators, both for his fixed and mobile telecommunications. Similarly, each op-
erator faces competition for traasmitting the communications of clients, both where
national and international communications are concerned. In this changed market,
the pricing strategy each operator has for transmitting his clients' communications,
is an important aspect of his overall business strategy. It is in light of this view that
this research is accomplished.
1.1 A Stackelberg Pricing Game
Consider a network defined by a set of nodes and a set of arcs connecting these nodes.
Several clients are to be routed on the network. Whenever a client is routed on an
arc, he faces the cost of using that particular arc. Each client wishes to route his
demand from source to destination in the network, and wishes to do so at minimum
cost. If the cost of routing on all arcs is given beforehand, the problem consists of
solving for a shortest path in the network for each client.
We introduce an agent in the network, the leader, who can determine the cost of
routing each client on a subset of all arcs in the network, i.e. the tariff arcs. Whenever
a client takes a tariff arc, the associated cost is transferred as revenue to the leader.
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Figure 1.1: The NTP with two clients and a single tariff arc. j jj'f
The leader wislws to maximize his revenue from clients taking tariff arcs and plays a
sequential, two-stage game with the clients. In the first stage, he sets the tariffs on
the tariff arcs, taking into account the reaction of all clients. Once the leader has set
tin- tariffs, the cost, of routing on all arcs in the network is known and the clients are
fared in the second stage of the game with a shortest path problem in the network.
The game played by the leader and the clients is the network tarification problem,
and is an instance of a Stackelberg game [59].
The Network Tarification Problem
The network tarification problem (NTP) involves two noncooperative groups: tariff
setting agents and tariff following clients. We focus on one agent: the leader. We are
given a network, where the leader can set nonnegative tariffs on a subset of all arcs
in the network: the tariff arts. The other arcs in the network are the fixed cost arcs.
The fixed cost arcs are owned by other agents in the network, whose tariffs are known
a priori. The cost of routing a client's demand on a fixed cost arc is thus given. Each
client wishes to route a certain amount of flow (a commodity) on a path connecting
two vertices. We assume that all demands of all clients are known a priori. Given
the tariffs as set by the leader, each client selfishly selects a path with minimum total
cost to route his demand. Such a path can involve tariff and fixed cost arcs. The cost
on the tarilf arcs of that path is transferred as revenue to the leader. The objective
of the leader is to maximize his individual total revenue.
Example 1.1. Consider the NTP for the network given in Figure 1.1. We are dealing
with two clients with unit demand. The first client (client A) wishes to route his
demand from node 1 to node 2. The second client (client B) wishes to route his
demand from node 5 to node 6. The leader has to set the tariff for a single tariff arc,
depicted by the dashed arc: The arc (3.4) with tariff ri per unit of demand. The
other arcs in the network are the fixed cost arcs, whose cost per unit of demand is
given.
Since both client* have unit demands, for each client the cost of routing on the
tariff arc is t> t. If we consider client B. we see that the leader can set a tariff of at most
4. For a tariff of vt =4, client £ takes the path (5.3,4.6) with cost 3 + 4 + 4 = 11,J.I. A STACKELBEfiG PRTCJNG GAME 19
Figure 1.2: The NTP with a single client and two tariff arcs.
yielding a revenue of 4 to the leader. Moreover, for a tariff of t>i = 4, client A chooses
to take the path (1.3,4,2) with cost of 1 + 4 + 2 = 7, yielding tin additional revenue
of 4 to the leader. Total revenue to the leader is thus 8. For a tariff lower than 4.
clients A and B still take the tariff arc in the network, but their paths yield a total
revenue to the leader that is smaller than 8. This is nut in the best interest uf the
leader, who will thus never choose a tariff lower than 4. For a tariff higher thiin 4 on
the tariff arc, client 5 will not take the path going through the tariff arc. but take a
path that is shorter (the path (5,6)), yielding no revenue to the leader. Client .-1 will
take the tariff arc, as long as the tariff is not higher than !). The leader will however
never set the tariff between 4 and 9, since this is not in his best interest: Me can
increase his revenue from client A by increasing the tariff until i-| - !>. The optimal
solution for this example is a tariff of vi = 9, yielding a revenue of 9 to the leader.
Example 1.1 shows the contradictory interests of the leader and the clients: The
leader wishes to maximize his revenue, while the clients wish to take the path with
minimum cost in the network. Once the tariffs are set by the leader, the clients can
choose to take a path in the network with no tariff arcs. Note that whenever two
paths exist in the optimal solution with the same cost for the client, ties are broken
in favor of the leader, who can always decrease the cost of a path by e > 0.
Example 1.2. Consider the NTP for the network given in Figure 1.2. We are dealing
with a single client with a demand of 2 from source node 1 to target node 4. The
leader on the network has to set the tariffs for the tariff arcs depicted by the dashed
arcs, i.e. the arcs (1,2) with tariff t>i per unit of demand and (3,4) with tariff w-j
per unit of demand. The other arcs are the fixed cost arcs, whose cost per unit of
demand is given.
Since the client has a demand of 2, the cost of routing his demand on the arc (1,2)
is given by t»] • 2. Likewise, the cost of routing his demand on the arc (3,4) is give
by t>2 • 2. The client has four different paths to choose from: the path pi =(1,2,3,4)
taking two tariff arcs, the paths P2 = (1,2,4) and j>3 = (1,3,4), taking only one of
the two tariff arcs, and the path p^ = (1,4) taking no tariff arcs. In the optimal
solution, given the tariffs as set by the leader, the client takes the shortest path from
1 to 4 that yields the highest revenue to the leader.
Suppose that the path P2 is the shortest path in the optimal solution. Setting
t>i = 3 and t>2 large enough (a tariff higher than 4 in this case) maximizes the revenue
for the leader on the path p2- The tariff i>2 > 4 is necessary to ensure that the shortest20 CHAPTER i. .INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.3: A simple freight tariff setting problem.
path for the client is indeed the path p-^. For the solution ui = 3 and i>2 > 4, the
cunt of the path p? is 7 • 2 = 14 and the revenue to the leader is 3 • 2 = 6. Likewise, if
we suppose that, the path ;>i is the shortest path in the optimal solution, the tariffs
on the arcs mast be set to t>i > 3 and V2 = 4. The cost of the path is 14, and the
revenue to the leader is equal to 4 • 2 = 8. The optimal solution however is for the
client to take the path pi, given the tariffs vi = 2 and t>2 = 3. For this solution, the
cost of the path pi is 6 • 2 = 12 and the revenue to the leader is 5 • 2 = 10.
Example 1.1 and Example 1.2 are both instances of the network tarification prob-
lem. As we shall see, their complexity is however very different: An efficient algorithm
to find the optimal solution of the network tarification problem with a simj/e tariff
arc exists. It is highly unlikely' that an efficient algorithm exists to find the optimal
solut ion of the network tarification problem with mufttp/e tariff arcs.
1.2 Applications
The network tarificat ion problem can be found in different industry sectors. Tradi-
tionally, most applications were in the transportation industry. Due to the deregular-
isatiou discussed earlier, several applications are currently found in the telecommu-
nications industry. We highlight some applications from these two industry sectors
in this section.
1.2.1 Transportation Industry
Consider a freight transportation network. A shipper company is faced with the
problem of t ransporting an amount of goods from origin nodes to destination nodes
at minimum cost. The cost of transporting the goods between nodes is determined
by the carriers. Each carrier is faced with the problem of determining these costs on
the arcs of the network that are in his control. When the cost of routing is known for
all carriers, the shipper company is faced with a standard transportation problem.
'The NTP is NT-hard, even for a single client and multiple tariff arts (see Roch, Savard, and1.2. APPLJCA77ON5 21
Broteorne, Labbe, Marcotte. and Savard [13] studied this problem and focused
on one carrier, who has to set the prices for routing flow on the arcs in his control.
The prices the other carriers in the network are asking for routing the flow on their
arcs are given beforehand and are thus viewed as costs. The objective of the carrier
is to maximize his revenue. See for example the network in Figure 1.3. For this
network, the carrier has to determine the cost of routing on a single tariff arc (given
by the dashed arc in the network). The shipper company is faced with two supply
nodes and two demand nodes. The other nodes in the network are transshipment
nodes. For the carrier, only two different tariffs are reasonable in t his example. He
either sets the tariff to 4, yielding a revenue of 40, or ho sets (In- tariff to 3. yielding
a revenue of 90. The optimal strategy for the carrier us thus to set the cost of routing
on the tariff arc to 3. */••••
Another application of the network tarification problem is the highway toll opti-
mization problem, as studied for example in Labbe, Marcotte. and Savard [41) and
Broteorne. Labbe, Marcotte, and Savard [14]. Consider a network of motorway* link-
ing several cities with each other and suppose that some of the motorways belong to
a private company or local government (the leader). Those motorways are subject
to tolls. Several clients in the network wish to go from one city to another one at
minimum cost. The problem of the loader is to maximize his rcvnmr Imiu ilir lolls
in the network, taking into account the reaction of the clients to the lull*.
1.2.2 Telecommunications Industry
The optimization of the price for transmitting communication in a network can give
the operator of a network a competitive advantage. Consider thus ii telecommuni-
cations network where several operators are active, as given in Figure 1.4 for the
international communications market. A node in this network represents access to
the network of an operator. In the example of Figure 1.4, two operators are active
in France, where each operator can provide access to all destinations in France. For
this application of the network tarification problem (the interconnections market), we
focus on one operator, the leader. The interconnections between the network of the
leader and the other operators are to be priced, in order to maximize the revenue of
the leader. The clients wish to transmit their demands from source to destination in
the network at minimum cost. In the optimal solution, the leader therefore routes the
demand, for the clients served, on the cheapest path in the network. Although this
route may go through the network of several operators, the client is only aware of the
leader and the total cost of the path. Note that for the international interconnections
market, an operator may be active in several countries.
The pricing of interconnections occurs not only at the international level, but
whenever operators have to decide on the price of interconnecting their networks.
It thus also occurs for example among the operators inside a country, who have to
transmit (mobile) communications from one point in the country to another point.
The network tarification problem is also encountered on the internet. The data
is transmitted on the internet using packets, as determined by the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) (see Stevens [60]). As such, data sent between two nodes in22 CHAPTER I. .INTRODUCTION
'••*?*.•
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Figure 1.5: Applications of the network tarification problem.1.3. VAR7ATJONS ON THE NTP CONSIDERED 23
the network can take disjoint paths. However, as noted by Ben-Amour, Michel, Liau,
Geffard. and Gourdin [5], some operators (for example France Telecom), require
the routing in the network to follow unique shortest paths, to bettor understand
what happens in the network. Whenever an autonomous system (represented by
some part of the network) has to transit data going through that network to other
destinations, the data can enter the network at different points. Other operators
have to pay a price for sending data through the autonomous system. The data flow
can be modeled such that once it is routed through the network, it does not |wuss a
second time. See for example Figure 1.5(a), where the clients have a choice of using
two different autonomous networks with two entry points to route their traffic from
source to destination.
Another application is in the field of point-to-point market*. Consider, for exam-
ple, a telecommunications operator that is offering bandwidth capacity between two
points i4 and Bat a certain price. Other operators are also active in this market,
whose prices for bandwidth capacity are known. The customer can select from dif-
ferent levels of Quality of Service (QoS) from each operator. The customer has an
ordered preference for all QoS levels.
We can model this problem as an instance of the network tarification problem.
Figure 1.5(b) shows a small example with two customers, represented by two com-
modities («i,t|) and (s-iJi). The operator has three QoS lewis, represented by the
subnetwork between the nodes q,, and q,<, where i£ {1,2,3}.
In this example, customer (ai.tj) is interested in two quality of service levels,
namely QoSl and QoS2, whereas customer (S-J.^J) « interested in QoS2 and QoS3.
The preference of each customer fc 6 A' with regard to each QoS level is given by
the cost of the edge from the source a* to the node <?,„, i € {1,2,3}. A smaller cont
indicates a higher preference for the QoS level. The price the other operators are
asking for the same QoS level is given by the cost on the arc (17,,,</,,), i 6 {1,2,3}.
The revenue to the operator for each QoS level t, i € {1,2,3} is given by the tariff
t/j on the tariff arcs (indicated by dashed arcs in the figure). The other fixed cost
arcs represent the cost of opening the market to the operator. The objective of the
operator is to maximize his revenue.
The networks in Figure 1.5(a) and Figure 1.5(b) have a special structure. This
special case of the network tarification problem is discussed in Section 1.3.2.
1.3 Variations on the NTP considered
In this section, we introduce several variations on the network tarification problem
studied in this thesis.
1.3.1 Pricing Strategy
At this point, we have only given examples of the network tarification problem where
the pricing strategy used by the agents was linear in the demand d. Other pricing
strategies may be available to the leader of the network. See Figure 1.6 for several24 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
(a) Linear (b) Fixed Charge (c) Inclusive Minutes
Figure 1.6: Several examples of pricing strategies.
pricing strategies studied in this thesis. Figure 1.6(a) shows the linear pricing strategy
discussed until now.
Figure 1.6(b) shows a fixed charge pricing strategy. For this pricing strategy, the
client pays a fixed price to be able to route his demand on an arc in the network.
The client incurs furthermore a cost per unit of traffic. Such a pricing; strategy is
commonly nurd by telecommunication operators in the market for fixed telephony.
Another example of n pricing strategy is the inclusive minutes pricing strategy,
illustrated in Figure 1.6(c). For this pricing strategy, the client pays a fixed price to
route a predetermined amount of data on the network. If his data communications
exceed this predetermined amount, he pays an additional price per unit of extra
traffic. Telecommunications operators commonly use an inclusive minutes pricing
strategy in the market for mobile telephony.
As we will see in Section 2.2, where we formally define all pricing strategies
studied, other pricing strategics are also possible in the network. All pricing strategies
studied are nonnegative, nondecreasing functions in the demand.
1.3.2 Network Structure
An important special case of the network tarification problem is the problem where
we assume that the path taken by any client utilizes at most one tariff arc. It is clear
from the applications of autonomous systems and point-to-point markets, described
in Section 1.2.2. that this network structure may indeed appear in practice. For
these problems, we can thus restrict ourselves to special networks that resemble the
situation of a town that is divided by a river. To cross the river, several possibilities
exist, such as bridges, tunnels, or boats. Local government may decide to put tolls
for each crossing on several of these transportation possibilities. This analogy is
reflected in the name for thus sj>ecial case, the river tarification problem.
This sptvial case also occurs in the international interconnections markets. For
some instances, the network structure may be such that we know a priori that the
path of each client takes at most one tariff arc. Consider, for example, a particular
instance of the international interconnections market, as given in Figure 1.4 on pageJ.3L VARIATIONS ON THE NTP CONSIDERED 35
C
Figure 1.7: Worst case scenario for the ALL-SERVICE NTP.
22, where several operators offer connections to destinations im«ide the same rountry.
If we focus on the market for one particular country, we know thai all demands
will be able to access the destinations inside that particular country through .several
non-sequential interconnections, for which the cost of routing must l>e determined.
We can assume that it is not proli table for the client to enter the country mure than
once. The tariff arcs are thus in an (s - t)-cut, for all demands from a node * to a
node t.
1.3.3 All-service NTP
For the network tarification problem, the clients are routed on the shortest path in
the network. Thus, in the optimal solution, some clients may take a path consisting
only of fixed cost arcs. These clients are thus served only by the competition. For the
all-service network tarification problem (AsNTP), the leader assumes that, he knows
beforehand all clients that must take one of tin- arcs in his control, i.e. all clients that
must be serviced. An optimal solution to the all-service network tarification problem
consists of revenue maximizing tariffs on the tariff arcs such that, given these tariffs,
each client is routed on the shortest path in the network, a shortest path that takes
at least one of the tariff arcs of the leader.
Figure 1.7 shows an example where the gap between the optimal solution of the
network tarification problem and the all-service network tarification problem may be
arbitrarily large. For this network, the leafier has a linear pricing strategy on one
tariff arc (given by the clashed arc). Two clients wish to route their demand in the
network. The first client has a unit demand from node 1 to node 2, with an upper
bound on the cost of the path of e > 0. The second client has a unit demand from
node 3 to node 6, with an upper bound on the cost of the path of C, where C* is
arbitrarily large. The cost of routing on the other fixed cost arcs in the network
is zero. The optimal solution for the network tarification problem is to serve only
the second client, yielding a revenue of C For the all-service network tarification
problem, the optimal solution yields a revenue of 2e.26 CHAPTER I. INTRODl/CTJOJV
1.4 Related Tarification Problems
In the transportation industy, tarification (or pricing) strategies can be used to dis-
tribute traffic over the network, e.g. to avoid congestion, or more generally in order
to minimize some measure of system performance that does not coincide with the
objectives of the participating clients. Minimizing system congestion is certainly de-
sirable from a global point of view. However, in such a solution, a small fraction of
the total traffic is sacrificed to the slower edge because it improves the congestion ex-
perienced by the majority of the clients in the network. Since very few drivers would
be willing to sacrifice their own short routes for the benefit of others, this drawback
has inspired .Iiilm, Mohring, and Schulz [35] to find traffic assignments that mini-
mize system congestion subject to length constraints. In this context, the structural
analysis of (Nash) equilibria versus system optima in networks with congestion has
been heavily researched recently. The papers by Roughgarden [55], MacKie-Mason
and Varian [47], and Cole, Dodis, and Roughgarden [20] are some examples.
Road pricing however also has a political aspect: how and when to introduce it.
It may therefore be difficult to impose optimal or near-optimal tolls due to political
reasons. This results in a congestion-pricing problem where it is not possible to set
the tolls on all roads in the network. In that situation, the flow in the network is said
to be (partially) unregulated. Liu and McDonald [45] and Roughgarden and Tar-
do.s [5(»] studied this particular case mid analyzed the loss in network performance
from this lack of regulation. As shown by Braess's paradox (see Braess [12]), careful
consideration needs to be taken when planning (new) roads and toll points: In some
cases removing roads in congested networks improves network performance. Braess's
paradox suggests the following network design problem: given a network with latency
functions on the edges and a traffic rate, which edges should be removed to obtain
the best possible How at. Nash equilibrium? Since levying a sufficiently high tax on
an edge in a network effectively removes it, taxation is at least as powerful as edge
removal. Roughgarden [54] showed that designing networks such that congestion is
minimized is NT-hard. This result is generalized in Cole, Dodis, and Roughgarden
[19], where edges are not only considered for removal but also for optimal pricing.
Verhocf [(».•»] develops! heuristic algorithms for the problem of determining the opti-
mal toll points and corresponding toll levels.
The transportation industry is not the only sector that is interested in (con-
gestion) pricing. Cote, Marcotte, and Savard [21] studied the tarification problem
that is found in the field of yield management in the airline industry as one of the
subproblems of the revenue optimization chain of an airline. Their problem fits in
the framework where the leader has a small market share: The leader's capacity is
limited, while the competition's capacity is assumed unlimited.
In the paper by Brotcorne, Labbe, Marcotte, and Savard [15], the network tarifi-
cation problem is combined with the network design problem in telecommunications
networks. They studied not only which tariffs to set on the tariff arcs, but also
whether or not i«> open the tariff arcs for routing. For thus problem, congestion doeB
however not play a role, since the arcs in the network are uncapacitated. Bouhtou,
Diallo. and Wynter [7] studied a pricing problem in telecommunication networks1.5. OUTLINE OF TffE THESIS 17
with capacity constraints, where the prices on the tariff arcs an restricted to be
Langrangiaii multipliers for the capacity constraints. These prices will therefore l>«>
strictly positive only when capacity is reached.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
In the next chapter, we formally introduce the network tarification problem and show
that it is a special case of bilevel programming. We introduce a remodeling of the
network, the shortest path graph model, that is equivalent to the original network.
The other chapters of the thesis are dedicated to the complexity, approximation
and optimization of the network tarification problem. These chapters build on the
notation and problem definitions described in the first part of Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the complexity of the problem si udied The network
tarification problem and two special cases, the river tarification |>i<>l>l<'in mid the all-
service network tarification problem, are shown to 1H> N3Miard. The remainder of the
chapter identifies some polynomial!)' solvable special cases of the network tarifirat ion
problem. Chapter 4 is dedicated to approximation results for the network tarilication
problem. We propose approximation algorithms for the river tarification problem,
and non-approximability results for the all-service network tarification problem. In
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we describe several exact algorithms. In Chapter f>, we
consider exact algorithms for a linear pricing strategy on t he tariff arcs. In ('hapter (i
these algorithms are generalized to allow for all pricing strategies studied. Moreover,
the consequences of each pricing strategy on the revenue to the leader and for the
clients is investigated.28 4 ..<• .*••,' '.' 'IChapter 2
The Network Tarification
Problem
This chapter formally introduces the network tarification problem studied. We model
the network tarification problem as a special case of hilevel programming and define
the different pricing strategies available. After defining our model and .setting our
notation, we briefly investigate the objective function of the leader. In Sin-turn 2.5,
we propose a remodeling of the network, which is equivalent to the original network.
2.1 A Special Case of Bilevel Programming
Consider two players, /I and J3, who play a two-stage, sequential game. Player /I
chooses his strategy in the first stage of the game, taking into account the optimal
strategy of player B. In the second stage, player B responds to player /Ts strategy.
Such a game is an example of a Stackelberg game (see Stackelberg [59], Tirole [61]
and Varian [64]). The player with the first-move option is usually called the leader,
whereas the second player is usually called the follower. Bilevel programming provides
an adequate framework for such a sequential game.
The bilevel programming problem is a hierarchical optimization problem where
the constraints are defined by a second (parametric) optimization problem (Marcotte
and Savard [48], Vicente [67]). Denote the decision vector of the leader by x and the
decision vector of the follower by y. A bilevel program is given by:
min 7(x,y) . •,•
«'.?. (i,»)e A" (2-1)
v e 8(i).
For the bilevel program in (2.1), 7(x,y) represents the objective function of the
leader, while S(x) represents the set of optimal solutions for the follower in terms of
the leader's decision vector x. It is a mathematical program parameterized in the
leader's vector x:
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argmin /(x,y)
•.«. (x,y)€K
The optimization problem of the leader in (2.1) is referred to as the upper level
or leader's problem, while (2.2) corresponds to the lower level or follower's problem.
In the literature, several classes of bilevel programs are defined. When both objec-
tive functions are linear, the problem Ls identified as a linear-linear bilevel program.
Similarly, a bilinear-linear bilevel program is a bilevel program where the leader's
objective function is bilinear, and the follower's objective function is linear. Anal-
ogously, we can define linear-quadratic bilevel programs, and the quadratic bilevel
program where both objective functions are quadratic. The difference between bilin-
ear and quadratic functions is that bilinear functions are linear with respect to each
of two variables.




y € arg min /(x, y')
«.r. (x,i/')ey.
Since the original formulation of a bilevel program by Bracken and McGill [11],
several authors studied bilevel programming intensively. The general linear-linear
bilevel program has been shown to be NT-hard by Jeroslow [36] and strongly XT-
hard by Hanson, Juumard, and Savard [33]. Even checking for local optimality in a
linear-linear bilevel problem is an XT-hard problem, as shown by Vicente, Savard,
and .Indict* [()(>]. Several algorithms using different methods have been proposed to
solve bilevel programming. Extreme point algorithms for linear bilevel programming
problems wire proposed by Candler and Townsley [17], Bialas and Karwan [6]. These
algorithms use tlu< property proved by Bard [3], Bialas and Karwan [6] that at least
one global optimal solution is attained at an extreme point of the set of relaxed
feasible solutions $2 = {(x,y) : (J,y) € X, (x,y) € V}, when this set is bounded. For
the linear-linear bilevol problem, branch and bound algorithms have been proposed
by Bard and Falk [4] and Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (28). Classical examples of
descent methods an- the algorithms proposed by Savard and Gauvin [57] and Kolstad
and Lasdou [40]. The books by Luo, Pang, and Ralph [46] and Shimizu. Ishizuka,
and Bard [58] are devoted to the theory and applications of bilevel programming.
Fbr additional references on bilevel programming, we refer the reader to Dempe
[24], Vicente and Calamai [68] who have compiled annotated bibliographies on this
subject containing more than one hundred references.
Bilevel Programs and the NTP
As shown by Labl>o. Mareotte. and Savard [42], Marcotte and Savard [49], bilevel
programs provide a wry natural framework for problems that arise whenever tariffs,2.J. -4 SPECIAL CASE OF BILEVEL PROGRAMMING 31
tolls or taxes are imposed on a set of commodities or activities. Let the vector x
denote the level of taxed activities and the vector y the level of untaxed activities.
The tax vector associated with the activity vector x is denoted by r. The leader stvks
to maximize the revenues raised from taxation, knowing that the follower will react
to his tax levels by trying to minimize his costs. This yields the following bilevel
program:
max y(r,i,y)
*.e. (x,y)€argmin /(r.x'.y') ' I ^ (2.4)
,....,,... 75. (x\y')€V,
where 7(r,x.y) is the objective function of the leader and /(r.x,y) the oltj
function of the follower. A bilevel program is generally written in vertical form. For




Consider the network tarification problem with a linear pricing strategy on the
tariff arcs and a single client. For the bilevel program in (2.5), let x denote the flow
on the tariff arcs and y the flow on the fixed cost arcs. The cost of routing on the













For the bilevel program in (2.6), Ai, respectively A2, is the node-arc incidence
matrix for the tariff, respectively fixed cost, arcs. The vector 6 is the supply/demand
vector for the client in the network. For the formulation in (2.6), we have written the
network tarification problem as a special case of bilevel programming. Both objective
functions are bilinear in this formulation. It is possible to write the bilevel program
(2.6) as a single-level program. Assuming the polyhedron {(x,y) : A|X + Ajy =
6. x. y > 0} is bounded, and the polyhedron {(x, y) : A^y = 6. y > 0} is nonempty, we
can replace the lower level with its optimality conditions (primal and dual feasibility
and primal and dual objective equality, see Chvatal [18]). This yields the following
(nonlinear) single-level formulation, where A represents the variables of the dual
problem:32 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARIFICATION PROBLEM
max T'X - ^ u -
«.£. A]X + A21/ = 6. ' '"'
^*f A < T ' ' (2.7)
AjA<c
2.2 Pricing Strategies
In this motion, we formally define the different pricing strategies available to the
agents of the network that we will study in this thesis, as described in Section 1.3.1.
Denote the set of arcs in the network by A. The set A is partitioned into the set of
tariff arcs T and the set of fixed cost arcs F. For each arc a € A, the cost of routing
a demand d is determined by its pricing strategy, denoted by p,,(d). All pricing
strategies p,,(d) studied are piecewise linear (not necessarily continuous) functions.
All pricing strategies are nonnegative, nondecreasing functions in d. The pricing
strategies that we will define besides a linear pricing strategy are commonly used
in telecommunication networks. All pricing strategies studied limit the number of
linear pieces in the function p,,(d) to at most 3.
Linear Pricing Strategy
For a linear pricing strategy, the cost of routing a client with demand d on the arc
a € A is determined by a variable unit cost «„ only. The pricing strategy p,,(d) for
an arc a € A is defined as follows:
(2.8)
Fixed Charge Pricing Strategy
In ca.se of a fixed charge pricing strategy, clients pay a fixed price to be able to route
their demands on the network. Furthermore, for each unit of traffic, the client incurs
a nonnegative cost per unit of traffic. Hence, for a fixed charge pricing strategy, the
pricing strategy on each arc a € A is given by:
*» -{?.•*
Inclusive Minutes Pricing Strategy
A small adaptation of the fixed charge pricing strategy is the inclusive minutes pricing
strategy, where the client pays a fixed price for a certain predetermined amount of
traffic. This amount of traffic is assumed to be known a priori and (possibly) different
for vacii tariff arc. We denote it by d^ for each arc a € A. If the client wishes to2.2. PRICING STRATEGIES 33
route more than d^ on the arc a € A, he pays an additional cost per unit of extra
traffic:
{
0 if d = 0
/J if 0<d<dJ, (2.10)
/» + i*f if d>di.
Piecewise Linear Pricing Strategy
In case of a piecewise linear pricing strategy, the client pays a fixed price and a
variable cost per unit of traffic, for each block of traffic. With this pricing strategy,
the function p«(d) for a client with demand d on the tariff arc « t .4 is:
0 if d = 0
Al+.-id if 0<d<dJ,
if di <d<d£, * '
if d>d?.
We assume the values of d^ and djj are known a priori for each arc a € A.
Staircase Pricing Strategy '
With a staircase pricing strategy, the client pays a fixed price for each predetermined
block of traffic in the network. For this pricing strategy, the function /»,,(d) for the
arc a 6 ^4 is given by:
0 if d=0
/„ if d > d^.
As is the case with the inclusive minutes pricing strategy, we assume the valued
of d^ and d^ are known a priori for each arc a£ A
Parametric Pricing Strategy
When dealing with a parametric pricing strategy, there Is a single parameterized
tariff, say u > 0, for all arcs. The pricing strategy on each arc a € /I is defined as:
^(d) = (<*„ + &u)d. =. (2.13)
A parametric pricing strategy has furthermore an interesting special case, where
Oo = 0 and /3<, = 1 for all arcs a € 7\ In that case, the tariffs are restricted to
be equal on all tariff arcs. We refer to this type of pricing strategy as the uniform
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Pricing Strategy on the Fixed Cost Arcs
As stated previously, the cost of routing a demand d on a fixed cost arc a € F is
known a priori. This cost is determined by the pricing strategy on the fixed cost arc,
as set by the other agents in the network. As such, it can be any of the previously
introduced pricing strategies. To emphasize that this pricing strategy is known a
priori, we will denote the cost of routing a demand dona fixed cost arc a 6 F by
<5,,(rf). This implies that <5,,(d) is a nonnegative, nondecreasing function in d for all
arcs a£f.
2.3 Model
The underlying structure of the network tarification problem (NTP) is a directed
graph 6' = (N, A), where A is partitioned into a set of tariff arcs T and a set of fixed
cost arcs F. The clients form a set of commodities A", where each client fc € AT has
a demand d* from node .i* to node /A-. The tariff arcs belong to the leader and incur
a toll for routing a client's demand. The fixed cost arcs are owned by other agents
in the network, whose pricing strategy is given beforehand. We denote the cost of
routing a demand d on an arc a € F by <S,,(d) > 0. The pricing strategy on a tariff
arc a € 7' is referred to by the nonnegative function />,,(d), where d is the demand to
be routed on the tariff arc. We define for a commodity it € K the set of all possible
l>nt\\s fmm so\mv to target by P^. Denote by T,,, respectively Fp, the set of tariff
arcs, respectively the set of fixed cost arcs, on a path p € P*. The revenue associated
with a path p for a demand d is defined by
,(d), (2.14)
whereas the fixed cost associated with the path p is given by:
*„(«*). (2.15)
The parameters of the pricing strategies (tariffs) on the arcs of T are determined
such that the total revenue of the leader is maximized. The clients on the network
route their demaiuls from source to destination according to the shortest path with
respect to total cost, where the total cost of a path is denned as the sum of all tariffs
and fixed casts on the arcs of the path: Define by A,,(d) = "»,,(d) + Tp(d). the length
of a path ;>. Note that whenever the demand is fixed, Ap(d) is a piecewise linear,
non-decreasing function in the tariffs. To ensure that the leader's revenue is bounded
from above, we assume the following.
Assumption 2.1. For «ir/> r/irot. t/irrr oiu'oys exists a patfi in tAe neruiorifc /rom
.sotmr /<> dctftnti/iofi f/»a< uses none o/ /-/if /art/f arcs.
We also suppose that whenever the client has a choice among multiple shortest
paths with the same total cost but with different revenues for the leader, the client
takes the shortest path that is most profitable to the leader.JNVESTIGATJUVG THE LJSADEH S R£ VEAfUE 35
Assumption 2.2. For /Lrnf lan^s. a citenf a/ways (aJbe5 <A«> sAortrsf pa*A in
fAa/ is moj( /at»ona6/r (o tAr /rarfrr.
We can justify this assumption, by noting that the leader can always decrease the
cost of the shortest path by £ > 0. In Section 2.2 we introduced all pricing strategies
studied in this thesis that the leader can apply on the tariff arcs. These are pricing
strategies that are commonly used among telecommunications operators and that
have the following property:
Assumption 2.3. TAe pricing $<ra<«"py on n fnri/f nrr is jtVen 6y a r»ormrt?a/it>r,
in tAe demand.
The pricing strategies are non-discriminatory (i.e., all clients fact* the same pricing
strategy for the same arc). We will furthermore consider networks in tclcvominuni*
cations, for which the amount of capacity available on the arcs in the network ia
such that all demand can be satisfied. We may therefore consider our networks to
be uncapacitated:
Assumption 2.4. 77»e capacity on a// arc* m (Ac nrftoorit M titiitmtfcd.
Note that Assumption 2.4 does not imply that the network tarification problem
is separable for all clients. The clients are linked through the tariffs.
The network tarification problem can be defined by the following bilevel program,
which holds for all pricing strategies studied:
max 53 7Tp;(dfc)
s.t. p£ € arg min A,,(d*) VJfc € A"
pefi
For the bilevel program in (2.16), at the upper level the revenue of the leader
is maximized, while at the lower level the clients take the shortest path, given the
tariffs determined at the upper level. Since the demands are known a priori, objective
functions of both the leader and the clients in (2.16) are linear in the tariffs and
hence we are dealing with a so-called linear-linear bilevel program. Furthermore,
since for each client the number of paths in the network may be exponential, the
bilevel formulation in (2.16) may have an exponential number of constraints. Labli^
et al. [41] defined a bilevel programming formulation using arc-variabl«;s, where the
number of constraints is not exponential (see also Chapter 5). Their formulation is
a generalization of the bilevel program given in (2.6), allowing for multiple clients.
Both objective functions (lower and upper level) are bilinear in the formulation.
2.4 Investigating the Leader's Revenue
Labbe et al. [41] have shown that it Is possible to obtain an upper bound on the
revenue to the leader. For a client fc € A' with demand d* from source node ** to36 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARIFICATCON PROBLEM
Figure 2.1: Upper bound on revenue is not reached.
target node £*, denote the shortest path from s* to f* using only fixed cost arcs by
the path u* € Pfc. Denote the shortest path (possibly using tariff arcs) when all
tariffs are set to zero by the path /*,. G P*. Consequently, for a client Jt € K\ 7^ (<**:)
IH an upper bound, and 7j (djt) is a lower bound on the cost of a path from sj,- to <*.
Proposition 2.1 (Labbe" et al. [41]). Given is m € P* and /* € Pjt /or a client
ifc € A'. >4n upper bound on i/ie retinue /or tAe /coder ,/rom eac/j c/ient fc € /f w
Proo/. The proof follows directly from the definitions of u* and /*. See also Labb£
et al. [41]. •
LabM et al. [41] showed that the upper bound Ujt(djt) of Proposition 2.1 is not
necessarily reached in the optimal solution. To see this, consider the network tarifi-
cation problem in the following example.
Example 2.1. We are dealing with a single client with a demand of 2 from source
node 1 to target node 4 for the network given in Figure 2.1. The leader on the
network has to set the tariffs for the tariff arcs depicted by the dashed arcs, i.e.
the arcs (1,2) with tariff t>i per unit of demand and (3,4) with tariff V2 per unit of
demand.
In Example 2.1, the leader uses a linear pricing strategy on the tariff arcs. An
upper bound on the cast of the client's path from node 1 to node 4 is given by the
cost of the shortest path from node 1 to node 4 using only fixed cost arcs, i.e. the
path U) = (1,4) with total fixed cost 7 • 2. A lower bound on the cost of the client's
path is given by the cost of the shortest path (possibly using tariff arcs) when all
tariffs are set to zero, i.e. the path /i = (1,2,3,4), using both tariff arcs, with a total
fixed cost of 2 • 2. Hence, an upper bound on the revenue for the leader is given by
14 - 4 = 10.
The client has four different paths to choose from: the paths pi = (1,2,4) and
pa = (1,3,4), taking only one of the two tariff arcs, and the paths ui = (1.4) and
ll » (1,2,3,4). Suppose the client takes the path pi in the optimal solution. It
is easy to see that setting t>i = 3 and t>a large enough (a tariff higher than 3 in
this case) maximizes the revenue for the operator on the path pi, while ensuring
that the shortest path for the client is indeed pi. Note that actually, for the solution
V| = 3, t>'j > 3, the path pi and ui have the same cost for the client. In that situation,INVESTIGATING THE L£ADER S REVENUE 37
6
Figure 2.2: Optimal tariffs may be negative.
we apply Assumption 2.2 and break the tie in favor of the leader. For tariffs «i = 3
and t»a > 3, the revenue for the operator is 3 2 and the upper bound on the cost of
the shortest path from 1 to 4 is reached. For the path />.., the same reasoning shows
that the maximal revenue for the operator on the path is also 32. It is easy to verify
that the optimal pricing strategy is to set the tariffs to t»i = vj = 2, inducing the
client to take the path /i yielding a revenue of 4 2 to the leader. Both the upper
bound on the revenue for the leader (given by 7 • 2 - 2 • 2 = 10) as the upper bound
on the cost for the client (which is equal to 7-2 = 14) are not achieved in the optimal
solution.
The pricing strategies studied in this thesis are all nonnegative, nondecroasinn
functions in the demand d (see Section 2.2 and Assumption 2.3). The following
example by Labbe et al. [41] shows that it may be profitable for the leader to allow
for negative tariffs. In the transportation industry, these negative tariffs ran be
viewed as subsidies on roads in the network.
Example 2.2. See the network described by Labbe et al. [41], given in Figure 2.2.
We are dealing with a single client with unit demand from source node 1 to target
node 4. The leader on the network has to set the tariffs for the tariff arcs depicted
by the dashed arcs, i.e. the arcs (1,2), (2,3) and (3,4),with tariffs ui, i»2, and v.j,
per unit of demand.
For tariffs vj = t>3 = 4, i>2 = -2, the revenue for the leader is 6, whereas nonneg-
ative tariffs will allow for a revenue of at most 4.
Recently, Roch et al. [53] have given us more insight into the quality of the upper
bound on the revenue defined in Proposition 2.1. Their example shows that the
upper bound on the revenue can be a factor of 0(log(|T|)) far from the optimum. A
simplified version of their example follows.
We define the single-commodity networks Z(fc), fc € {2 } recursively. The
network Z(2) is given by two nodes, one tariff arc and one fixed cost arc, as depicted
in Figure 2.3(a). In Figure 2.3(a), the tariff arc is given by the dashed arc, while the
cost of the fixed cost arc is 2. A single client is active in the network, who wishes to
route his demand from source a to target t. We construct network Z(fc), consisting
of two copies of Z(lfc - 1) and two extra nodes, corresponding to the source « and
target f for the only client in the network. This client has unit demand. The nodes
a and t and the two subnetworks Z(Jfc - 1) are linked by fixed cost arcs as depicted
in Figure 2.3(b).38 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARTFJCATJON PROBLEM
(a) Network Z(2) (b) Network Z(/t)
Figure 2.3: Upper bound on revenue 0(log(|T|)) far from the optimum.
For a network Z(fc). a lower bound on the cost of a path from s to < is given by
the shortest path (possibly taking tariff arcs) when the tariffs are set to zero. It is
clear that the cost of such a path in Z(2) is zero. Suppose such a zero cost path
exists for Z(A: — 1). In Z(fc) the client can either take a path going through the two
subnetworks Z(fc — 1) or the client can take one of the two paths going through only
one subnetwork Z(fc — 1). The shortest path (possibly taking tariff arcs) is the path
going through the two subnetworks Z(k — 1) with zero total fixed cost.
The upper bound on the cost of a path from .s to £ in the network Z(fc) is given by
tlit* shortest path using only fixed cost arcs with total fixed cost fc: For the network
Z(2) this is clear. Suppose the shortest path using only fixed cost arcs in the network
Z(A' - 1) has length A' - 1. In Z(A:) the client either takes a path going through the
two subnetworks Z(fc - 1) or the client takes one of the two paths going through only
one subnetwork Z(fr - 1). Since the cost of a shortest path using only fixed cast arcs
through the two subnetworks Z()t - 1) has length 2(fc - 1), the shortest path in the
network Z(Ar) goes through only one of the subnetworks Z(Jfc — 1) and has length Jfc.
The value of the optimal revenue to the leader for the network Z(Jt) is bounded
by 2: For the network Z(2) this is clear. Suppose the optimal revenue for the network
Z(fr — 1) is bounded by 2. In the network Z(fc) the client has three paths to choose
from. If the client takes one of the two paths through only one of the subnetworks
Z(fc - 1), the revenue to the leader Ls at most 2 from one of the subnetworks Z(it - 1)
on the path. If the client takes the path through both subnetworks Z(fc - 1), the two
fixed cost arcs with unit cast hound the revenue from each subnetwork Z(A: — 1) on
the path to at mast 1. Hence, the revenue on the path through both subnetworks
Z(Jt - 1) is at mast 2.
Summarizing, for a network Z(A;) the upper bound as defined in Proposition 2.1
is equal to A* while the optimal revenue from the network Z(fc) is bounded by 2.
Denote the upper (numd on the revenue for the single client in the network by Ui,2.5 THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH AfODEL
and consider the ratio:
2- (2.17)
For the network Z(lt), the number of tariff arcs in the network is 2* '-'. since the
number of tariff arcs in the network Z(2) is equal to 1 and doubles tor ,-ach new
network that is created. Hence, fc = 0(log(|T|)) and (2.17) shows that the upper
bound on the revenue can be a factor of 0(log(|T|)) far from the optimum.
In order to gain some insight in the objective function of the leader, cousider the
network of Example 2.3.
Example 2.3. Consider the network in Figure 2.4. The leader is using it linear
pricing strategy on the only tariff arc in the network, given by a dasheil H. The
cost of routing on the fixed cost arcs is given for the nonzero tived rust ,,K . In
the network 4 clients are active, each with unit demand. Tht•.-><• ,m ^n<n U ihe
commodities (1,2), (3,4), (7,8), (9.10).
For the network of Example 2.3, the tariff on the tariff arc is given by W|, since
we are dealing with a linear pricing strategy. For the leader, the revenue ut a tariff
of Vi is given by:
~~ (2.18)
For this example, the objective function of the leader is plotted in Figure '2.5,
showing that the objective function is discontinuous, nonconvex and piecewise lin-
ear. As noted by Labbe et al. [41], the objective function is upper seini-rniitinuous,
implying that there exists at least one optimal solution to the network tarification
problem.
2.5 The Shortest Path Graph Model
The networks considered for the network tarification problem are quite often large
networks. We propose a remodeling of the network using shortest paths, that is
equivalent to the original network in the sense that the optimal solution in the orig-
inal network has the same value as the optimal solution in the remodeled network.
Generally, the new network is more compact.
2.5.1 Remodeling the Network
If for given tariffs a client will select the shortest path, say p, between the two end
nodes of his commodity, then clearly, the subpaths of p are also shortest paths.
Consider two tariff arcs ai = (ii,ji) and 02 = (12^2) that appear consecutively on
p. Then the subpath between ji and 12 is a shortest path that contains only fixed
cost arcs. Thus any path p with tariff arcs a*, t € {1,..., |T"p|} taken by a client can
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Figure 2.4: Network for Example 2.3.
Figure 2.5: Shape of the leader's objective function.2.5. THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH AfODEL 41
Figure 2.6: Shortest Path Graph Model for |T| = 3.
P= {*Pi>°i.sP2<<*2.-••.*P|7v|,a|TV|i»P|T,,|+i}i (219)
where aj\, t € {1,..., |Tp| + 1} is a shortest subpath using only fixed cost arcs to or
from a tariff arc on the path. Since such paths can ho computed lining the original
data for all pricing strategies described in Section 2.2, we can construct a new graph
model, in which this is actually done.
We define this graph model for a single client and a linear pricing strategy first.
Subsequently, we argue that it holds for all pricing strategies studied and show how
to extend it to multiple clients.
Consider the original graph G = (N, A) with the tariff arcs in T C A For a
client with a demand rf from s to t, we define the graph G* = (JV*, X*) and the tariff
arcs T* C i4*. In this graph, the tariff arcs are copied from G as a set of separate
arcs having no nodes in common. So, arcs with a common vertex are separated.
Next, we construct the following fixed cost arcs. For two tariff arcs tt| = (ii, ji) and
O2 = (t2, J2) we connect ji with 12, if there is a path in G that uses fixed cost arcs
only. Similarly, we connect J2 with ij. From the source * we construct, arcs to each
tail node of the tariff arcs, and from each head node of a tariff arc we construct an
arc to the destination <, again only if paths exist using only fixed cost arcs in G.
Finally, we construct a fixed cast arc in G* from s to t. Any fixed cost arc in A* has
a cost equal to the length of the shortest path between its end vertices in G, using
only fixed cost arcs in G. The new network is called the shortest path graph model
(SPGM). (SPGM)
Example 2.4. Figure 2.6 shows the shortest path graph model of any network
containing three tariff arcs for a commodity from s to t. The tariff arcs are given
by the (dashed) arcs (ii, ji), (»2. J2) and (13, ./.»)• All other arcs are representations of
the shortest path using only fixed cost arcs between each node. The cost of the arc is
the cost of the corresponding shortest path in the original network between the two
nodes. If no path exists between two nodes in the original network, the corresponding
arc in the shortest path graph model is not present or has infinite cost.42 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARIFJCAT/ON PROBLEM
The SPGM remodels the network by changing the fixed cost arcs of the network.
It thus hold* for all models where shortest paths calculations can be done a priori
on the fixed cost arcs: the tariff arcs are just copied to the SPGM, including their
pricing strategy. Since we assume the demand of each client is known beforehand,
we can use the shortest path graph model for all pricing strategies.
The shortest path graph model can furthermore be extended to multiple clients,
as shown next. Bouhtou, van Hoesel, van der Kraaij, and Lutton [10] noted that, for
a linear pricing strategy on the fixed cost arcs, the creation of all the shortest path
graph models has a special feature: the inner </nip/i (consisting of the end vertices
of the tariff arcs, and the arcs between them) is equal for all commodities and hence
needs to be calculated only once. Additional shortest path calculations are necessary
only for the arcs leaving the source and/or entering the target of each commodity.
Thus, for a linear pricing strategy, one possibility to extend the shortest path graph
model is to add arcs from all source nodes to all tariff arcs and from all tariff arcs
to all target nodes. The other possibility is to extend it by creating a shortest path
graph model for each client. This is even necessary for all pricing strategies described
in Section 2.2, except the linear pricing strategy, since the path between two nodes
of the inner graph is not necessarily the same for each commodity in that case. In
Section 2.ft.2, the size of the shortest path graph model will be reduced by deleting
(redundant) arcs from the inner graph for each client. We therefore choose to extend
the shortest path graph model to multiple clients by creating a shortest path graph
model for each client, even in case of a linear pricing strategy.
Proposition 2.2. 77ie network o/ t/ic s/iortesf pat/» grap/i mode/ is equivalent to the
nptwiorifc.
/'TOO/. The shortest path graph model includes all shortest paths in the network, that
are of the form (2.19), for all subsets T), C 7\ Furthermore, the network tarification
problem applied to each network has an optimal solution of the same value: if a path
exists in the original network, then there exists a path in the shortest path graph
model which is at least as good. Alternatively, if a path exists in the shortest path
graph model, then a path with the same cost exists in the original network. D
One of the main advantages of the shortest path graph model, is that several op-
timization methods developed for the original network can be applied to the SPGM.
Often, these methods will perform better on the SPGM since it Is a more compact
representation of the original network, as we will illustrate in Chapter 5 for a linear
pricing strategy and in Chapter (J for the other pricing strategies studied. Further-
more, since the SPGM provides intuitive insight into the problem, its properties are
useful for the proof of several theoretical results.
2.5.2 Reduction Methods
Wo can decrease the size of the shortest path graph model considerably by using
reduction methods. The aim of these methods is to decrease the size of the SPGM
even further and to limit the amount of |>otentially shortest paths for a commodity to
an acceptable number. First, we describe some techniques with which we can remove2.5. THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH MODEL
Figure 2.7: Detailed view of tariff arc.
arcs from the network. Second, we describe a dominance relationship for paths that
reduces the set of potentially optimal paths. All reduction methods propone! are
valid for all pricing strategies studied.
Arc Reductions
Denote by u^, the cost of the shortest path using only fixed cost arcs from node i
to node j in (7, i.e., u,j- is the length of the arc (i, j) in G*. Let /jj denote the cost
of the shortest path from i to j in G, possibly using tariff arcs, when the tariffs are
set to zero. We restrict ourselves to a single commodity, when; node ,s represents
the source node and node < the destination node. In Figure 2.7 we depict the values
defined here: the u,j are arc values, and the /^ are node values.
Since for all a 6 T and all pricing strategies described in Section 2.2 it holds that
Po(^) ^ 0, we can say that /jj is a lower bound for the cost of a path from t to j, and
Ujj is an upper bound for the cost of a path from i to j taken by the client.
Proposition 2.3. ///^/ = Uj(, t/ien ony optima/ pa</i /rom .s <» f M.«n</ nodf j can
»ise arr (j, <)• a" o</ier arcs /caving j can 6c removed.
Proo/. A lower bound on the cost of a path, possibly using tariff arcs, from j to £ is
/jt. An upper bound is given by u^. If Zj< = Ujj, there is no room for taxation on
any path from j to t. Thus, (j, t) is an optimal choice. •
Proposition 2.4. // /„ = u,,, <Aen any ophmai pain /rom s <o < uitrig noaV; i r^jn
use arc (s, i): a// o</ier area enterino i can 6e removed.
Proo/. Analogous to proposition 2.3. D
Proposition 2.5. Consider <wo tari/f arcs: (ii.Ji) and (12,^2)- //"jit < ">itj +'>»£»
u/e can deiete arc (ji ,12)-44 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARIFICATION PROBLEM
Proo/. The lower bound on the cost of a path from ji to f taking the arc (ji,t2) is
equal to u^,ij + /;,». An upper bound on the cost of a shortest path is given by tij,t-
Hence, there is no room for taxation on a path from ji to t using the arc (ji«*2)-
Thus, (ji, <) is an optimal choice. •
Proposition 2.6. Consider fu>o fari/f arc*: (ti, Ji) and (12,72)- lfu««i < U>JM+'«2»
we can ddete arr (J21 i 1) •
Proo/. Analogous to proposition 2.5. •
Proposition 2.7. //u,i < /„, + />,«, we con de/ete £Ae tari/f air (M,JI).
Pnw/. The lower bound on the cost of a path going through the tariff arc (i'i, ji) is
'»»i + '71'• Hence, there is no room for taxation on the tariff arc (i 1. j 1), and thus
(«,<) is always at least as good. D
Proposition 2.8. Consider <u/o <art/f area: («i,ji) and (12,^2)- //"«« < /«», +"ji«a +
/j,e. <"c can de/ete t/ie arc (j 1, »2) •
Proo/. The upper bound on the cost of a shortest path from 3 to t is u,t. A lower
bound on the cost of a path using the tariff arc (ti,ji) and going to the tariff arc
(*a. J2) i« »•• '«ii + "jiij + 'jj»- Hence, there is no room for taxation on a path from s
to f using the arc (ji, ij). Thus, this arc need not be used in an optimal solution. •
Refer to the shortest path graph model for each client as the initial shortest path
graph model, and the shortest path graph model obtained after the application of
the reduction methods as the reduced shortest path graph model.
Example 2.5. Consider the network depicted in Figure 2.8. This network has 14
nodes, 21 fixed cost arcs and 3 tariff arcs. The tariff arcs are given by the arcs
(1,2), (3,4) and (11,12), represented by dashed arcs. The solid arcs in the network
represent the fixed cost arcs. The leader on the network is dealing with one client
who has a unit demand from node 13 to node 14. The leader maximizes his revenue
from a linear pricing strategy.
Figure 2.9(a) shows the initial shortest path graph model for the network of
Example 2.5. The solid arcs in the graph are representations of the shortest path
using no tariff arcs between each node in the original network given in Figure 2.8. The
cost of the arc is the ctwt of the corresponding shortest path in the original network
bet-WIH'II the two nodes. If no path exists between two nodes in the original network,
the corresponding arc in the initial shortest path graph model is not present.
To arrive at the reduced shortest path graph model, we need to apply the reduc-
tion m<tluHl> III'M lilxxl in section 2.5.2 to the initial shortest path graph model. In
Figure 2.9(a). we MV \\V can delete the arcs (4,1). (2.3) and (4.11) of the initial short-
est path graph model by applying for example Proposition 2.5 or Proposition 2.6.
Furthermore. Prop<xsit ion 2.7 allows us to delete the tariff arc (11.12) from the graph,
since the upper Ixnmd on the cost of a path Is 11 while a lower bound on the cost of
a (with going through the tariff arc (11.12) is 12.2.5. THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH A/ODEL 45
Figure 2.8: A small network with |7| = 3 (Example 2.5).
(a) Initial SPGM (b) Reduced SPCM
Figure 2.9: Shortest Path Graph Model for Example 2.5.46 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARJFICATJON PROBLEM
Figure 2.10: Dominated paths example.
The reduced shortest path graph model is shown in Figure 2.9(b). For this graph
it is easy to nee that the optimal solution is to set the tariff on the arc (1,2) to 7,
while setting all the other tariffs to a suitable large value, i.e. 11, yielding a revenue
of 7 to the leader.
In the remainder of this thesis, when referring to the shortest path graph model
of a client, we will refer to the reduced shortest path graph model, unless specified
explicitly.
Path Reduction
By applying the propositions described in Section 2.5.2 and finding all paths in the
graph, we can obtain a reduced set of paths that remains relevant for the commodity.
Hopefully, this set of paths is small. It is however possible to reduce the size of this
set in some instances even more by eliminating patlis which are always dominated
by others. The notion of path dominance is given by the following definition.
Definition 2.1. // we can nep/ace in a// /easib/c solutions t/»e pat/i a fry tne pat/i p
wttnouf vio/aftna f/ir /rastfri/tfy roN.s/njints or decreasing t/ie value o/ t/»e objective
/unction, tAin patn p dominates po//» a.
The following proposition allows us to eliminate dominated paths. Recall that Tp
is the set of tariff arcs from path />, and that 7p(d) is the total cost of the fixed cost
arcs from p for a client with demand d.
Proposition 2.9. fori-sidcr a potfi p and a patn q. //Tp C T, and 7,(d) > 7p(d),
t/»en pat/i p dominates patJi q /or a// <artj^ values.
Proo/. Suppose that path q is the shortest path taken by the client. Then
•>,(<*) + £ Pa(d) £ ">,(<*) + £ PaM' (2-20)
or equivalently,2.5. THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH AJODEL 4 47
P.(d) < 7p(<*). (2.21)
Since ->„(<*) > 7p(d) and p,,(d) > 0 for all tariff arcs a € T. inequality (2.21) only
holds when 7,(d) = 7j,(d) and p,,(d) = 0 for all a € T,\T,,. But then, we can replace
path 9 by path p without violating the feasibility constraints or changing the value
of the objective function since path ;> has the same revenue for the leader and the
same cost for the client as path <j. Inequality (2.21) shows furthermore that whenever
7,(d) > 7p(d). path q can never be the path taken by a client in a feasible solution,
since path p will always be cheaper. D
Example 2.6. An instance where dominance of paths occurs is given in Figure 2.10.
The tariff arcs are the dashed arcs (ti.ji),(«„•. ja) and (M.jn) The leader is dealing
with a client who wants to route his demand from node .s to node /. The path
9 = {«.«i.ji.«2.J2,'} with fixed cost 7 is dominated by the path p = {Miiji.t}
with fixed cost 6. The client will never select the path 7.
2.5.3 River Tarification Problem
The river tarification problem is the special case of the network tarification problem
where the network structure is such that any path taken by a client take* at moat one
tariff arc (see Section 1.3.2). The shortest path graph model for the river tarification
problem has a simple structure: Obviously, for a single client, the shortest path graph
model as described in Section 2.5.1 can be applied to the river tarification problem.
Furthermore, since by definition, there never exists a fixed cost arc between two
tariff arcs, the inner graph is the same for all commodities and all pricing strategies
studied. There is thus no need to separate the shortest path graph models for each
client. We can thus add arcs from each source to all tariff arcs and from all tariff
arcs to each target.
One may further note that all propositions in Section 2.5.2 are redundant except
for Proposition 2.7, which aims at deleting some tariff arcs. For the river tarification
problem, deleting a tariff arc for a specific client without disallowing another client
to take it can be achieved by deleting the arc to the tariff arc and the arc from the
tariff arc for that specific client only.
Figure 2.11 gives an example of the shortest path graph model for an instance
of the river tarification problem with three tariff arcs (represented by the dashed
arcs) and two clients. For this example, the client («2. ^2) does not take the tariff arc
(ti.ji)-
2.5.4 Insights into the Shortest Path Graph Model
The shortest path graph model focuses on the important information in a network.
For example, for each client, multiple feasible paths exist in the network between
two tariff arcs. To be more specific, the number of feasible paths in the network is
in theory exponential for each client. However, a client is not interested in all these48 CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARJFJCA77ON PROBLEM
Figure 2.11: Shortest Path Graph Model for R.TP.
paths. Indeed, the only relevant path between two tariff arcs is the shortest path
between them.
In addition, the shortest path graph model considers only relevant tariff arcs.
This is illustrated by Proposition 2.7, which deletes tariff arcs in the network that
are never taken by a client. The intuition behind this proposition can be illustrated
i>> uotwnrloi with ourlirloHti <li«tnnrps See Figure 2.12. where the tariff arcs are given
by the dashed arcs, with one client routing a unit demand from s to t. The cost of
I he fixed cost arcs is given by its euclidean length. The further away the tariff arc
from the source or destination, the less likely it is used by the client. We would thus
expect the shortest path graph model to perform well in case of networks where the
tariff arcs are spread out evenly over the network. For each client, the number of
relevant tariff arcs will be small, limiting the number of relevant paths.
Note that the size of certain instances can be increased by the transformation.
The initial shortest path graph model is essentially a complete graph whose size
depends on the number of tariff arcs. The number of fixed costs arcs in the initial
shortest path graph model is of 0(|T|^). For a number of tariff arcs large enough,
the number of fixed costs arcs in the initial shortest path graph model can be higher
than in the original network. The reduction techniques can however still decrease the
number of fixed cost arcs and allow for a smaller sized reduced shortest path graph
model.
The number of undominated paths in a network is bounded by the number of
possible subsets of T, i.e. by 2'^': If two paths p and q have an identical set of tariff
arcs, then the undominated path is the path with smallest fixed cost. It is possible
to construct (artificial) networks, where the number of undominated (relevant) paths
in the SlKiM approaches the upper bound on the theoretical number of paths. See
Example '2.7 for such a network.
Example 2.7. Consider a network with |T| tariff arcs, denoted by ai,... ,a|7> A
single client has unit demand from s to t. The fixed cost arcs are defined as follows.
The cost of the fixed cost arcs from the source s to the tariff arc a,, i € {1 |T|}
is given by 3'. The cost of the fixed cost arcs from the tariff arc a,, t € {1 , |2.5. THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH AfODEL
Figure 2.12: Network with euclidean distances.
Figure 2.13: Network for Example 2.7, for |T| = 3.so CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK TARIFICATJON PROBLEM






















































to tin- target. / is given by 3'""*"' '. Furthermore, a fixed cost arc with cost &* '
connwts a tariff arc a, to a,, where i, j € {1,..., |T|} and i < j. Finally, the cost of
the fixed cost arc («,«) is set to 3'*"'+'.
AH stated earlier in Section 2.5.1, any path p with tariff arcs a*, i 6 {1,..., |Tp|}
taken by a client can be described as the path:
P= (2-22)
For the network in Example 2.7, any subpath of p of the form
rn € {1,..., |7j,|}. has fixed cost of the form 3' + 3^, where i, j € {1,..., |T|}. re-
construction, such a subpath is bounded by a fixed cost arc with cost 3'"^, as can be
seen from Figure 2.13, where the network of Example 2.7 is depicted for |T| = 3.
For the network in Example 2.7, we show by induction that if we have a path
p, then for any path </ where 7), C T,, |T,| = |T),| + 1, the fixed cast of p is higher
than the fixed cost of (/. Proposition 2.9 therefore does not allow us to eliminate
dominated paths in this network. Thus, all paths in the network are undominated.
It is en.sy to see that this property holds for the path p using only fixed cost arcs.
Tin' I-KM nf such a path is 3'" + ', whereas any path with one tariff arc has a fixed
cost of 3' + 3^ < 3^''', where i + j = |T| + 1. Now, assume we have a path p with
tariff arcs 7), as described in (2.22). For any path </ such that Tp C T,, |T,| = |T,,| +1
exactly one subpath .sp,,,, m € {1 |T,,| + 1} is replaced by a subpath with one
more tariff arc. We assume without loss of generality that the replaced subpath has
fixed cost 3*'. By construction, such a subpath can only be replaced by a subpath
with lixed cost 3' + 3'. where « + j> = it. Since 3' + 3-> < 3*, we have that the fixed
cast of p is higher than the fixed cost of (/.
Another type of network where the number of undominated paths in the shortest
path graph model may be large is the following.
Example 2.8. Consider grid graphs with unit costs on the fixed cost arcs in the
network. We consider a client with unit demand from the upper left corner of the
grid to the lower right corner. The tariff arcs are a subset of all arcs in the network,
but only arcs from left to right or top to bottom.
For an » x ri grid, the upper bound path using only fixed cost arcs has cost 2(n— 1).
Every tariff arc is present in the SPGM of the client (see Proposition 2.7), since the2.5 THE SHORTEST PATH GRAPH MODEL 51
cost of using a path with exactly one tariff arc is at most 2n - 3. Furthermore, every
time the shortest path of a client takes an additional tariff arc in the network, the
cost of the path is decreased by one unit, while the path remains undominated.
Several networks using the structure of Example 2.8 wen- created, as follows.
The number of clients in the network with unit demand was >< i t.> I. i.e. from each
corner of the grid to the opposite corner. The grids created n< ,.| s, , c . n v . s
and 10 x 10, with two-way arcs between the nodes. The laiill au> an a^i^ned
randomly in the grid. The other arcs in the grit! are fixed c<vst arcs, with unit cust.
The percentage of tariff arcs ranges from 2.5% to Id' l'.il>le 2.1 shows the number
of relevant paths for these networks. The column MIN. ie.sp. MAX, indicates the
minimum, resp. maximum, number of patlis generated over all commodities. The
column AVRG gives the average nunit>er of paths generated for en< h . ••tniuodity for
the whole data set. From Table 2.1 we can see that the number <>l nlcvant piiths
increases when the numl>er of tariff arcs increases in the network. As we will see in
Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, the number of relevant paths for real life instance* ami
random instances is considerably smaller.52
;• ' ' J--i ,*.•.:"-*Chapter 3
Complexity
The network tarification problem was long suspected to bo NT-hard; Labi*' et al. [41]
showrd that the decision version of the network tarincation problem with negative
fixed costs, positive lower bounds on the tariffs and a single client is NT-complete.
However, the case with nonnegative fixed costs and nonnogative tariffs remained
open. Marcotte, Savard, and Semet [50] showed that the network tarification prob-
lem is a special case of the well-known travelling salesman problem (si*; Uantzig,
Fulkerson, and Johnson [23]). Fortz and Thorup [29, 30] studied the (related) prol>-
lem of optimizing the weights of the arcs in a network for a given set of projected
demands so as to avoid congestion and showed that this problem is NT-hard. Since
imposing a sufficiently high tax on an edge in a network effectively removes it, tax-
ation is at least as powerful as edge removal. In that context, Roughgarden [54]
showed that designing networks for congestion minimization is NT-hard.
Recently, Roch et al. [53] showed through a reduction from 3-SAT (see Carey and
Johnson [31], Papadimitriou and Steiglitz [52]) that the network tarification problem
with a linear pricing strategy is NT-hard even with a single commodity (client),
nonnegative fixed costs and nonnegative tariffs. Their proof can be generalized even
further to allow for the case with nonnegative fixed costs and negative tariffs.
In this chapter we give an overview of the complexity results known for the net-
work tarification problem. To this end, we provide in a first instance the proof given
by Roch et al. [53] in their paper. We then show that the river tarification problem
remains XT-hard, by presenting a reduction from 3-SAT to the network tarincation
problem with multiple clients, where each client in the network takes at most one
tariff arc (see Grigoriev, van Hoesel, van der Kraaij, Uetz, and Bouhtou [32]). This
proof also shows that the network tarification problem remains NT-hard, even for
unit demands, a fixed number of tariff values and when the leader is forced to use
tariffs such that he serves (a given subset of) all clients. Consequently, the all-service
network tarification problem remains NT-hard. In a second part of this chapter,
polynomially solvable special cases of the network tarification problem are discussed
(see van Hoesel, van der Kraaij, Mannino, Oriolo, and Bouhtou [63]).
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Figure 3.1: Subnetwork for (^,1 V £,2 V ^3). ; ^ f < ; ^
3.1 N^-completeness
Consider a boolean function / : {0,1}" —» {0,1} on n variables xj, ..., x,,, in
conjunctive normal form. Such a function / is the conjunction of m clauses C*,
each clause C/t being the disjunction of three literals, C\- = (^1 V ^2 V ^3). Any
literal ^ represents either a variable x,, or its negation Xj,i€{l,...,n}. Then / is
satisfinble if there exists an assignment X| x,, such that at least one literal per
clause is true. A function of the form (3.1) is usually called a 3-CNK function.
3.1.1 Network Tarification Problem
Roch et al. [53] showed that the network tarification problem with a linear pricing
strategy is strongly NlP-hard by a reduction from 3-SAT (see Garey and Johnson
[31)). The proof holds for a single commodity and a linear pricing strategy on the
tariff arcs.
Theorem 3.1 (Roch et al. [53]). 77»e network tan/icahon pro6/cm wtt/i /tnear
is srrrmg/j/!
Proo/. The 3-CNF formula / in (3.1) can be transformed in polynomial time to an
instance of the network tarification problem. For each clause, create a subnetwork.
This subnetwork consists of a tariff arc for each literal and two nodes s,- and r,-. A
fixed civst arc with zero e<xst links node s,- to the source of each tariff arc and links
the target of each tariff arc with the node f,.. A fixed cost arc with cost 1 furthermore
exists Itetween node .1,. and f,.. See Figure 3.1 for an illustrative example.
The subnetworks corresponding to consecutive clauses r and r + 1 are connected
by a tariff arc and a fixed cost arc with a cost of 2 between node fr and Sr+i-
Furthermore, for every i>air of tariff arcs that appear consecutively in the network
and that correspond to a literal and its negation, we create a fixed cost arc with11. NP-COAfPLETENESS 58
cost 1. We refer to this fixed cost arc as the inter-clause fixed cost arc. Finally, we
introduce a single client with unit demand from the source of the first subnetwork
to the target of the last subnetwork. See example 3.1 for the transformation of a
specific 3-CNF formula.
For the network tarification problem, if for the optimal tariffs the client in the
network takes a shortest path that goes through the tariff arc «,,, then the corre-
sponding literal is true.
Refer to the shortest path from a to t using only fixed cost arcs by the |»th u,<
and to the shortest path (possibly using tariff arcs) when all tariffs are set to zero
by the path /„<. For this network, a lower Ixnnui on the cost of a path is given by
the path /„( with total cost 0 when all tariffs are zero, while an upper hound is given
by the cost of the path u,, with cost m + 2(m - 1) = 3m - 2. An upper bound on
the revenue to the operator is thus given by 3m — 2. We now show that the H-CNF
formula / is satisfiable if and only if the revenue to the leader is equal to the upper
bound on the revenue of 3m - 2 in the corresponding network.
To see this, assume the optimal revenue is equal to 3m - 2. The leader can
only achieve this revenue if the total cost of the fixed cost arcs on the shortest path
taken by the client is 0. This shortest path must yield a revenue of 2 between two
consecutive subnetworks and a revenue of 1 for each subnetwork. Hence, the tariff
on each tariff arc between two subnetworks is equal to 2 and there exists one tariff
arc with tariff 1 per subnetwork. The tariffs on the tariff arcs of each subnetwork
are moreover high enough for the shortest path to not take a tariff arc with tariff 1
in two subnetworks that correspond to a literal and its negation: The corresponding
inter-clause fixed cost arc would then restrict the tariff on a tariff arc connecting two
subnetworks to at most 1, instead of 2. Hence, the shortest path corresponds to a
consistent assignment of the variables and / is satisfiable.
Conversely, suppose that / is satisfiable and consider the path corresponding to
the consistent assignment. This path does not take a variable and its negation, since
it would then not correspond to a consistent assignment of the variables in /. Thus,
no inter-clause fixed cost arc restricts the revenue on the tariff arcs between two
subnetworks. The upper bound on the revenue of 3rn - 2 is therefore achievable on
this path. D
Example 3.1. The 3-CNF formula given by (xi V X2 V X3) A (xi V14V ±2) can be
transformed to the network given in Figure 3.2. Here, the tariff arcs aj 1,012,013
correspond to the literals X1.X2.X3 and the tariff arcs 021,022,023 correspond to the
literals X1.X4.X2. The tariff arc O] is the tariff arc connecting the two subnetworks.
The inter-clause fixed cost arcs are given by the arcs between the tariff arcs an and
021 and between the tariff arcs 012 and 023. A single client has unit demand from a
to <. For this example, m = 2. Hence, (xj V X2 V 2:3) A (xi V14V zj) is satisfiable
if and only if the revenue to the operator is 4. The optimal path through the tariff
arcs ai2.aj and 022 can achieve a revenue of 4 and corresponds with X2 = X4 = 1,
with xi and X3 free.56 CHAPTERS. COAfPLEXJTY
Figure 3.2: Network for (i, V12 V13) A (£, V14 V ij).
Figure 3.3: Subnetwork for variable x,, i € {1 n}.3.1. KP-COMPLETENESS 57
3.1.2 River Tarification Problem
The reduction used by Roch et al. [53] works for network tarification problems whore
paths are allowed to use (and indeed, must use) many tariff arcs. To show that the
river tarification problem, where we are dealing with multiple clients that take at
most one tariff arc in the network, is XT-hard we need a different reduction, which
we provide here (see also Grigoriev et al. [32]).
We use a reduction from 3-SAT to the river tarification problem with linear pricing
strategies. Any function of the form (3.1) can be polynomially transformed to an in-
stance of the river tarification problem as follows. For each variable jr.,, t € {1,..., n},
we construct a constant-size subnetwork as shown in Figure 3.3. Each of these sub-
networks has three clients (commodities) with unit demand, with origin-destination
pairs {a,j,t,j}, j € {1,2,3}. Moreover, each subnetwork has two tariff arcs, a, rep-
resenting the truth assignment r, = 1, and d, representing x, = 0, as depicted in
Figure 3.3.
An upper bound on the cost of routing clients 1 and 3 is given by fixed eowt
arcs (s.i.r,i) and (s,i,f,;i). both with cost 3. For client 2. the upper bound on the
cost is given by a fixed cost arc (sii.f.a). with cost 2. The maximal revenue for each
subnetwork is thus given by setting one of the tariffs to 2, and the other to 3, yielding
a revenue of 2 • 2 + 3 = 7. In all other cases, the revenue is not more than 6.
Next, for each clause C*, fc € {1,... ,m}, we create a c/au-se-commodttj/ fc with
origin destination pairs {sfc,r.jt}, with unit demand. Whenever a variable x* (£<,
respectively) appears as one of clause CVs literals, we connect a*, to .s,i (.<*,.(, re-
spectively), and <n ((,3, respectively) to f^., using arcs of zero cost. In addition, we
introduce a fixed cost arc (s/t,r-/t) with cost 2, defining an upper bound of 2 for the
cost of routing clause-commodity fc. The so-defined instance of the river tarification
problem has 2n tariff arcs, 3n + m commodities (or clients), and 7m + 11// fixed
cost arcs, hence the transformation is indeed polynomial. Example 3.2 illustrates the
transformation.
Example 3.2. The boolean function / = (xi VX2 Vx.j)A(xi VX2VX4) on 4 variables
.r 1..... X4 can be transformed to the network displayed in Figure 3.4. A tariff arc a*
(resp. dj) represents the truth assignment x, = 1 (reap, x, = 0), i € {1,... ,4}. D
Theorem 3.2. 77ie river tori^cotton pro6/em uritt /inear pricing «<ra<egies is «<rongi/y
Proo/. Consider the polynomial transformation defined previously. We show that
a satisfying truth assignment for / exists if and only if the revenue for the river
tarification problem is equal to 2m + 7n.
Suppose there exists a satisfying truth assignment. Then at least one literal in
each clause C\-, Jfc € {1 m} is fulfilled. Take for each C* one fulfilled literal
and set the tariff on its corresponding tariff arc to 2. The complementary tariff arc
receives tariff 3. Due to the fact that we start with a valid truth assignment, this
is indeed well-defined, since either 1, = 1 or 1, = 0, but never both. This way, the
total revenue from all clause-commodities is 2m. For all remaining subnetworks, if58 CHAPTERS COMPLEXITY
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any. the two tariffs can be set arbitrarily to 2 and 3, respectively. The revenue from
all subnetworks is thus 7r>. Hence, the total revenue is 2m + 7»».
Conversely, suppose there exists a set of tariffs such that tho total revenue is
2m + 7n. The maximal possible revenue created by all except the clause-commodities
is 7n, only achievable by setting one tariff arc per subnetwork to 2 and the other to 3.
On the other hand, the maximal possible revenue created by the clause-commodities
is 2m. Hence, in order to achieve a revenue of exactly 2m + 7r», we must have hot li, 2m
from the clause-commodities, and 7n from the remaining commodities. We i.. >» . l.tine
a truth assignment, setting 'true' all literals that correspond to tariff arcs <>i cost 2.
This is a well-defined truth assignment, since we know that in each subnetwork one
tariff is 2 and the other 3. Moreover, each of the m clause-commodities contributes
a revenue of 2, hence it must use a path with a tariff arc of cost 2. In other words,
for each clause at least one literal is 'true', hence the truth assignment satisfies all
clauses. D
3.1.3 All-service NTP
The reduction used for the proof of Theorem 3.2 shows that the river taritical ion
problem with linear pricing strategies remains NT-hard even for unit demands and
a fixed number it > 2 of possible tariff values. The same reduction shown that the
following holds:
Corollary 3.1. 77te a//-.sendee nehuorA; tort/icatton pnoWem uht/i /tnear pricing s<na<-
e^tes is sfrong/y NT-Zianf.
Proo/. See the proof of Theorem 3.2. We can use the same reduction, since the river
tarification problem is a special case of the network tarification problem. In the above
proof, we in fact show that a satisfying truth assignment for / exists if and only if
the revenue for the network tarification problem is equal to 2m + 7n and the leader
serves all clients.
D
Remark. All pricing strategies studied (except a staircase pricing strategy)
contain linear pricing as a special case. The proofs of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2
thus show that the network tarification problem, river tarification problem and all-
service network tarification problem are NT-hard for all these pricing strategies. For
the proof of Theorem 3.1 we are dealing with a single client in the network with unit
demand, while each client in the proof of Theorem 3.2 has unit demand. Therefore,
there exists an equivalent staircase pricing strategy for the linear pricing strategy
in each proof. NT-hardness of the network tarification problem, river tarification
problem and all-service network tarification problem for all pricing strategies studied
thus follows from these proofs.
3.2 Polynomialiy Solvable Special Cases
This section focuses on polynomialiy solvable special cases of the network tarification
problem. Some cases (all with linear pricing) have been described in earlier work.60 • CHAPTER 3. COMPLEXITY
Labbe et al. [41] identified the case with one commodity where the path in the -|
network taken by the client in the optimal solution is known a priori (fixed path .,
linear tarification problem). Furthermore they show that for multiple clients and -
one tariff arc (single arc linear tarification problem) the problem is also polynomially
solvable. We show that the following special cases are polynomially solvable too (see si
also van Hoesel et al. [63]).
For a linear pricing strategy, if the number of tariff arcs is upper bounded a priori,
we show that the optimal solution can be obtained by solving a number (polynomially
hounded by the number of clients) of linear programs. We refer to this type of
problem an the bounded arcs linear tarification problem. If we restrict the tariffs to
b« dependent on a single parameter (parametric pricing strategy, see Section 2.2),
we can solve; the problem in polynomial time for an unlimited number of tariff arcs.
Parametric tarifioation has furthermore an interesting special case, where all tariffs
are restricted to be equal on all tariff arcs. The problem with multiple clients and
one tariff arc for the fixed charge pricing strategy (single arc fixed charge tarification
problem) is shown to be polynomially solvable by a geometric algorithm. Moreover,
we show that the fixed path linear tarification problem can be generalized to allow
for multiple clients and all different pricing strategies studied (multi-commodity fixed
path tarification problem).
Finally, we focus on the river tarification problem. If the number of clients is
bounded or if the cost on the edges of the network follows a special structure, then
the river tarification problem can also be solved in polynomial time.
3.2.1 Bounded Arcs Linear Tarification Problem
In this section, we study the complexity of the network tarification problem with
linear pricing strategies and a bounded number of tariff arcs. The bilevel program
defined in (2.16) is shown to be equivalent to a class of linear programs. Each
linear program is constructed in such a way that the path taken by each client in
the solution is fixed. Together, the linear programs in the class are equivalent to
the linear network tarification problem. The number of linear programs to solve is
bounded by |A"| ' 5(|r|), while each linear program is of size /i(|T|). Note that
the functions /(|T"|),^(|T|) and /»(|T|) depend only on the size of the set of tariff
arcs. The number of linear programs to solve is therefore polynomially bounded by
the number of clients, whenever |T| is upper bounded a priori. Since we can solve a
linear program in polynomial time (see Khachian [39], Karmarkar [37] and Aspvall
and Stone [2]), the bounded arcs linear tarification problem is polynomially solvable.
For any client fc 6 A', consider two paths pi,pa € Pfc- If pi is to be the shortest
of the two paths, the constraint Ap, (d*) < Ap.j(dfc) must hold. Thus:
*p,tofc)-*P,(<fc) < 7p,(«**)-'Vp, (<**)• (3-2)
The constraint Ap, (d*) < Ap^dit) is therefore of the form:3.2. POLYTVOMIALLY SOLVABLE SPECIAL CASES 61
-^**(Pi-P») (3.3)
Here, 6*(pi.p2) is a constant and Ti and T2 are disjoint subsets of T. Note that
7i contains the tariff arcs in pi that are not in p-j, and T-j contains the tariff arcs
in P2 that are not in pi. Tariff arcs on both pat Its do not appear in this constraint,
and hence we may assume Tj O72 = 0. The constant 6*'(pi,p-j) is referred to in the
remainder as the .sunfr/img t'aiuf for the pair (pi,;>-.») for a client A- t A', since pi is
shorter than P2 if equation (3.3) holds and p? is shorter than pi if equation (3.3) does
not hold. If pi and p-2 have the same set of tariff arcs, then 7'i = 7'j = 0. In that case,
the left hand side of (3.3) evaluates to zero. Thus, the sign of fe*(pi,p-j) determine*!
which of the two paths is shortest, for all possible tariff values. We compute for each
client it € K", for all pi,p2 € P/t, the switching values fc*(|»i.pa).
We denote the set of all subsets of T by 7. The set of all pairs of mutually disjoint
sets of tariff arcs is then defined as:
= 0) (3.4)
Let B be the increasingly ordered sequence of switching values {b*(pi,pa)|Pi €
Pfc-P2 e Pfc.Jfce A"} U {-00,+00}, say B = (fcn.fc, 6«). For each pair (Ti.T,) €
T*, we introduce an index in the ordered sequence B, say re {1,...,/?}.
For any (7\, T2) e 7*, we select an index, say r(Ti, T2) € {1,..., i?}. We consider
the following set of constraints:
5Z ^) Ta) 6 T^ (3.5)
Lemma 3.1. Gn;en a c/ioice r(Ti,T2) € {1,..., fl} /or oH (Ti,T2) € 7*, tfien /or
eac/i c/ien< A; € /C t/iene exists a patft p^. € Pjt *Aa* ** t/ie shortest paift /or o// <arij9s
satas/j/in<7 </ie constraint in p.5y, i/ ^5.5^ is not empty.
Proo/. We prove that for each client fc 6 /f and each pair of paths pi € P/t and
P2 € Pt, one of the two is shortest for any tariffs satisfying (3.5). For two paths
with the same set of tariff arcs this is trivial, as noted previously, so we can restrict
ourselves to paths for which this is not the case.
For any client A: € if take two arbitrary paths pi G P/t and P2 6 P/t • As we have
seen previously, the constraint Ap, (d/t) < Ap,(d/t) is equivalent to the constraint:
(3.6)
where 6*(pi,p2) is one of the switching values in the sequence B. Denote the index
of this switching value by f. For the constraints in (3.5), the pair (Tj,T2) in (3.6)
has index r(ri,T2).62 CHAPTER 3. COMPLEXITY
If f>r(T,,Tj), then
o€Tj
implie« that A,,,(dfc) < A,^,(dfc). Conversely, if f < r(Ti,T2), then 6? < 6,.(T,,T3)-I-
Thiw,
H « - Wi.Ta) (3-8)
o€Ti o€Ta
implies that A,,,(d/i) > A,,,(<4). Concluding, for all tariffs satisfying the coastraints
in (.'{.5), then- oxwts therefore a complete ordering of paths according to path length
per commodity. For all fc € A", there is thus a path pj[. that is the shortest for all
pathtt in P^. The tariff arcs on this path yield a revenue of ny (d^.). D
Now, corwider (3.5) for a choice r(Ti,Tz) G {1,...,/?} for all (Ti,^) € 7^ and
let the path pj be the shortest for all paths in P^. for each client fc G A". The revenue
associated with the path p£ is given by the linear function:
(3.9)
For a choice r(Ti,72) € {l,...,fl} for all (Ti,T2) € 7^, define the following linear
program, referred to as LP(r):
(3.10)
Refer to the optimal value of the network tarification problem with a linear pricing
strategy on the tariff arcs, defined by the bilevel program given in (2.16), as
Theorem 3.3.
*LP(r) = ZA/CTP (311)
Proo/. Given B and a choice of r(Ti, ^ for all (Ti, T2) G 7^, an optimal solution (if
it exists) to LP(r) generates a feasible solution to zj/erp. Therefore:
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Consider the optimal solution of A/CTP. This yields a set of tariffs when* for all
clients fc € A' a path pj € P/t is the shortest path. Given the optimal set of tariffs
v* = «)oer, we define Q(T,.r,>:
T2)€T» (3.13)
o€Ti o€T»
Now, for all (7\, 7j) 6 T*, choose r(T,.r,) such that:
*,™,-i < a<T..7M < *f,r,.T,, V(r,.Ta) 6 7* (3.14)
Such an f(r,,r,) exists for all (Ti.Ta) € 7* and all clients A- e A' since the
sequence B has values ranging from (-oc, +oo). Given this choice of *"(j-,,7'j) ^ *M
(Ti.Ti) € 7*. the solution t>* is feasible in LP(f). Thus,
*MCTP < *tP(f) (3.15)
FVom equations (3.12) and (3.15), it follows that
*£#»(f) = *MCTP (3.16)
•
We have shown that the optimal solution of the bilevel formulation of the net-
work tarification problem with linear pricing strategies can be obtained by solving
a number of linear problems as in (3.10). In the remainder of this section, we will
compute bounds on the number of linear programs to be solved and on the size of
each linear program. ; •
Lemma 3.2. For eoc/i c/ten< fc € A', </ie num6er o/pot/is in t/ie network i.s ftoundcd
6j/e|T|!.
Proo/. Given the shortest path graph model defined in Chapter 2.5, the maximum
number of paths for a client ifc € A' is defined by selecting an ordered set (possibly
empty) of tariff arcs. A set of £ arcs can be ordered in t! ways and be chosen in (',')
ways. Therefore, a bound on the number of paths is given by:
in in m in
' ' /ITM\ ' ' ITMI I ' 1 • ' 1
Vpl](' = y ^ t' = |r|»y" - = |T|!V- <eiri! (3.17)
^W ^(m-t)l« '"^(|T|-t)! l^2-t!-«' ^ '
D
Lemma 3.3. T/ic numfrer o/ cfements in tne sequence B w bounded by |A"|(e|T|!)*.
Proo/. Each element of the sequence B is determined from a constraint of the form
(3.3), where for a client it € A two paths pi € P* and P2 € P/t are comparer!. For
a client fc 6 A', the number of comparisons is at most |Pjt|^. FVom lemma 3.2 we64 CHAPTER 3. COMPLEXITY
know that |/\ j < e|T|!. Hence, the number of elements in the sequence £ is at most
Theorem 3.4. De/ine /(|T|) = 4""', o(|r|) = (e|r|!)'""' and A(|T|) =
T/if: netuwrifc tarincation proftZem urc't/i a Zinear pricing .strateoj/ can 6e soZred 6y
|A'|-^"'"«(|T|)/i(|7'|) Zinear programs, eac/i o/u>/itc/i is o/size at most /i(|T|).
Proo/. It follows from Theorem 3.3 that we need to solve a number of linear programs
as defined in (3.10). Kach of the constraints in the linear program LP(r), described
in (3.10), is defined by a choice of Ti C T and T2 C T, such that Ti D T2 = 0.
The number of possible subsets of (Ti.Ti) is bounded by 2'^'2'^' = 4'*"', hence
the nunibrr of constraints for each LP(r) is bounded by 4'*"'. For each constraint
there is a choice of at most |A'|(e|T|!)^ right hand sides. Hence, the number of all
possible linear programs LP(r) is at most {|A'|(P|7'|!)*}'* = |A'| g(|T|), where
/(|7'|) = 4'" and ,g(|7'|) = (c|T|!)" . The size of each linear program LP(r) is
defined by the number of variables (at most |T|) and the number of constraints (at
most 4'''). Thus, the size of each linear program is bounded by /i(|T|) = |T|4^'. •
Note that an enumeration scheme for the single commodity linear network tar-
ification problem has a complexity of 0(|T|4'''r|T|!): we can solve e|T|! fixed path
linear tarification problems, which correspond to LPs of size |y|4'^'. However, such
an enumeration scheme for the multiple commodities linear network tarification prob-
lem has to solve (e|T|!)!^l multi-commodity fixed path tarification problems, which
is not a polynomial function since |A'| is not a constant.
3.2.2 Parametric Tarification Problem
Another polynomially solvable variant of the network tarification problem is the
parametric tarification problem (PTP). Recall from (2.13) that for this problem we
restrict the tariffs on all tariff arcs to a single parameter i>: Pa(d) = (Q,, + /?av)d for
all a € T.
Given a value for the parameter r», we can calculate the shortest path tree for
each client. Knowing the shortest path taken by each client for this value of u, we
can determine the revenue for the leader. For each shortest path to a node j€JV
there are at most |T| tariff arcs on the path. When increasing the tariffs on all tariff
arcs, the shortest path tree will change for some tariff value u*, decreasing by at least
one tariff arc the number of tariff arcs on the shortest path to a node j € AT. See
for example Figure 3.5, where the initial shortest path tree (Figure 3.5(a)) for an
instance with |7'| = 3 is depicted. For this example, increasing the tariff on all tariff
arcs to some tariff value r*, yields a new shortest path tree (Figure 3.5(b)) where
the tariff arc (1,2) is skipped. Therefore, the number of tariff values at which the
shortest path tree of a client fc € A" changes is 0(|V|^).
To keep track of the changes of the shortest path for each client, we maintain a
shortest path tree. Finding the breakpoints in the shortest path tree for each client
A: € A' corresponds to solving |A'| instances of the parametric shortest path problem,
one for each commodity. Young, Tarjan, and Orlin [69] and Karp and Orlin [38]3.2. POLYNOMIALLy SOLVABLE SPECIAL CASES 65
(a) AU tariff arcs (b) OM tariff arc skipped
Figure 3.5: Increasing the tariff on the shortest path tree for PTP.
studied this problem and showed that the number of breakpoints is 0(n'^). They
furthermore described an algorithm which finds all these breakpoints in 0(«m +
n^logm) time. Here, |V| = n and |E| = m. With this result, we can find all
breakpoints in 0(|/f |(nm + n^ logm)). Denote these breakpoints by »>i,..., u/j and
by 7Tfc(v») the profit to the leader from client fc € A" when the value of the parameter
v is set to t>t, i € {1,..., B}. If we denote the shortest path taken by the client A: € A'
at parameter value i>j by p£, 7Tfc(i>i) is given by the following:
X! (°«+ &"<)<**• (3-18)
Now, let •''
x* 6 arg max I ^ jrfc(t>0 > • -? - ~ (3.19)
The optimal pricing strategy on each tariff arc a € T is given by:
(3.20)
Note that an interesting application of parametric tarification occurs when /?„ (d) = ud
for all a G T. For this particular problem, the tariffs are restricted to be equal on all
tariff arcs. We refer to this pricing strategy as the uniform pricing strategy. Uniform66 •••«•• M ^ CHAPTER 3. COAfPLEXJTY
tarification is used in Chapter 4 to obtain an approximation algorithm for the river
tarification problem.
3.2.3 Fixed Path Linear Tarification Problem
LabW et al. [41] have shown that when the path taken by the client is known a priori,
the singl<!-commodity network tarification problem with a linear pricing strategy can
be solved in polynomial time. In their paper, they show that the single-commodity
fixed path linear tarification problem can be solved by a linear program. This linear
program cornssponds to the dual of the shortest (« — <)-path problem defined on a
modified graph of the original network.
Roch et al. [53] have developed a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the
name problem to optimality. The idea of the algorithm is as follows. Recall from
Section 2.5.1 that any path 7; with tariff arcs a<, t € {1, •.., |Tp|} taken by a client
can be described as the path:
P = {«Pi.oi,ap2,a2,... .«P|Tp|>a|Tp|.*P|7V|+i}. (3-21)
where sp,,,, m € {1,..., (T^l + 1} is a shortest subpath using only fixed cost arcs to or
from a tariff arc on the path. For the single-commodity fixed path linear tarification
problem, we; art: given a path p* for which we must determine the revenue maximizing
tariffs v,,, on the tariff arcs a,,,, me {1,..., |Tp|} such that given these tariffs, p* is
the shortest path in the network. For the dynamic programming algorithm of Roch
et al. [53], we suppose without loss of generality that the nodes on the path p* are
denoted in ascending order by {0,..., 2|7},| + 1} and that we are dealing with a single
client with unit demand. For each tariff arc a,,,, m € {1,..., |T),|} we furthermore
denote by /t(u,,,), respectively <(a,,,), the head, respectively the tail of the tariff arc.
Let Ujj be the cost of the shortest path from node i to node j using only fixed cost arcs
and let /,j denote the cost of the shortest path from i to j, possibly using tariff arcs,
when the tariffs are set to zero. Thus, «ij is an upper bound for the cost of a path
from /' to j taken by the client, and Z*j is a lower bound for the cost of a path from
i to j (see also Section 2.5.2). The revenue maximizing tariffs ?;„,, rn 6 {1,..., |T,,|}
are found recursively, starting with the first tariff arc on the path as follows:
»* > , (3-22)
fc<m J
The recursion in (3.22) sets the tariff on each tariff arc at its upper bound, as de-
termined by all possible shortest paths using only fixed cost arcs from a node i to a
node j on the path p*.
3.2.4 Multi-Commodity Fixed Path Tarification Problem
We generalize the result by Labbe et al. [41] for the single-commodity fixed path
tarification problem by showing that the multi-commodity fixed path tarification
problem is solvable by a linear program for all pricing strategies studied.3.2. POLVNOMiALLy SOLVABLE SPECIAL CASES 67
Recall from Chapter 2 that the cost of routing a demand d on a tariff arc a € T
is given by p<,(<i), whereas the cost of routing a demand on a fixed cost arc a € F is
given by £<,(d). Let 6* be the vector for each commodity Jt € A' where for index i:
f 1 if i Sk,




if i = a*
if ii = <t,
otherwise.
and let the vector y* € R'"*' represent the flow on the arcs, for commodity A- e A'.
Define by t\ respectively j", the outgoing arcs, respectively, incoming ares of node
j € TV. Consider the following arc-formulation of the network tarification problem:
min
••'• E I/a - E Va = *f V* € A",V» G AT
y*>o ' vjfceA'.VoeA
In the bilevel model (3.24), both objective functions are bilinear. Assuming that
the pricing strategy is fixed, the lower level problem consists of solving |A'| inde-
pendent shortest paths problems. Thus, as shown by Labbe et al. (41) for a linear
pricing strategy, this bilevel formulation can be written as a single level problem,
by replacing the lower level linear program by its optimality conditions: primal and
dual feasibility, and the duality gap constraint. This yields the following (nonlinear)
formulation:
-A?<p,,(dfc) VfceA-,Va = (z,j)€T (3.25)
-A? <«„(«**) Vfc€A-,Va = (i,j)eF
E /»«(<**)»£ + E ««(<fc)rf = Af, - A*, Vfc e AT
y*>0 VJfceA",VaeA
The single-level formulation (3.25) is nonlinear due to the product /9,,(<ifc)y£ em-
bedded in the objective function and the duality gap constraint. However, since we
assume the path taken by the clients in the optimal solution is known, the valuesCHAPTER 3. COMPLEXITY
of y^ can be set to 0 or 1 a priori for all a € /I and all it £ A'. This eliminates
the nonlinearity of the objective function and the duality gap constraint in (3.25).
Hence, we can find the revenue maximizing tariffs for the multi-commodity fixed path
tarification problem by solving the following linear problem:
max 53 53 Pa(<**)
/..«. A} - A* < p,,(dfc) V*€ff,Va = (i,j)€r
A* - A* < *„(<**) V* € ff, Va = (*. j) € F
£ P.Mk) + £ «.(<**) = Af. - A*, Vfcetf
(3.26)
Note that when fixing the path taken by each client in the solution a priori, it is
possible that no tariff values exist for which each path taken in the solution is the
shortest path in the network. The linear program given in (3.26) is therefore feasible
if and only if (here exist tariffs such that all the fixed paths are indeed shortest paths
in the network.
3.2.5 Single Arc Linear Tarification Problem
As shown by Labb£ et al. [41], the network tarification problem for a linear pricing
strategy is solvable by a polynomial time algorithm, in case of a single tariff arc in the
network. To see this, denote that single tariff arc in the network by a*, i.e. T = {a*}.
For each commodity, we consider two paths. Recall from Section 2.4 the shortest path
Ufc taken by client A" € A" from node »*• to node <*.., using only fixed arcs, whose cost
7«j.(^*) '" *" upper bound on the cost of any path from s^. to i/t. Recall furthermore
/k, the shortest path taken by client fc with smallest fixed cost from node s* to node
<v, taken by the client when the tariff is equal to zero. Clearly, 7j (d*) is a lower
bound on the cost of any path from s*. to f *... An upper bound on the revenue induced
by each client fc € AT was therefore defined as Ujt(dfc) = 7u^.(dfc) - 7j (djt). When
considering a unit demand for each client, this upper bound allows us to determine
for each client fc t A' the maximum tariff for which a client A; € A" still takes the
tariff arc a*, denoted by Tfc = U*(l).
Let the clients A: € AT be ordered in nonincreasing order of the values r* such
that:
•••' (3.27)
For any tariff r on the tariff arc a* such that t> is not equal to one of the values
in the sequence (3.27), we can increase the tariff with e > 0 and achieve a higher
revenue. Thus, any optimal tariff t»* is equal to one of the values in the sequence
(3.27). Moreover, for a tariff t> = Tj, t € {1,..., |A'|} the leader will only serve clients
A: < » for which Ujt(djt) > t>dj,-. Thus, the revenue Il(r,) for the leader at a tariff of 77





Figure 3.6: A single arc fixed charge tarincation.
fc<<
The revenue maximizing tariff is thus given by 7\., where
t* = arg max Ilfa)
(3.28)
(3.29)
3.2.6 Single Arc Fixed Charge Tarification Problem
Recall the fixed charge pricing strategy on a tariff arc a € 7\ previously defined in
(2.9):
-{
0 if d = 0
/„+«„</ if d>0.
(3.30)
The fixed charge tarification problem can be solved in polynomial time when
dealing with a single tariff arc and multiple clients, using a geometric algorithm. To
this end, we denote the upper bound on the revenue U*(dfc) defined in Section 2.4 for
each client fc € 7f by Ac*. Note that we can discard clients for which Ac* is equal
to zero.
Consider Figure 3.6. In this figure, we are dealing with six clients. All clients
fc € if are plotted as the (square) points defined by (dfc,Acjt). The line in the
figure represents a fixed charge tariff function Pa(<f) for the single tariff arc a € 7"
we are considering. A commodity fc G A" yields revenue to the leader if and only if
/a + fadfc S Act. As we can see in the figure, four clients (which are above the line)
yield revenue to the leader, while two clients do not. The revenue to the leader from70 i CHAPTER 3. COAfPLEXJTY
dj d
Figure 3.7: Rotating the fixed charge tariff function.
each commodity in given by the dots in the figure. Refer to the set of points (dfc,
for all Ac 6 A' as the set t/. As the following lemma shows, to find the optimal fixed
charge tariff function, we can restrict ourselves to consider only those tariff functions
that contain at least two points in [/.
Lemma 3.4. (7iwn i.s a set o/ e/ients A" and a simj/e tari/f arr wzt/i a /tied c/ianye
pfirtm/ .s/.rat«/i/. 77ir o/ittmai/u;e<f c/jarge fartjQ''/unctton contains at /east two points
tnd.'
Proo/. Without loss of generality, we assume that the optimal fixed charge tariff
function, the function p*(d) = /* + v*d, serves the clients in the set S C A". Thus,
for the single tariff arc n € T, /* + t»*d^ < Ac* for all clients fc e S. Suppose that the
tariff function />*(d) contains none of the points in [/. In that case, we can increase
/*, yielding a higher profit. Now, suppose the function p*(d) contains exactly one
point in [/, say (d£, Ar£), as depicted in Figure 3.7. We will show that in that case,
there exists a tariff function which contains at least two points in (/, yielding at least
as much revenue to the leader.
The tariff function ^>*(d) containing (d£, AcJ) is given by the line p*(d) - AcJ =
i;*(d — d£). The total revenue to the leader is thus:
(3.31)
If we rotate the tariff function p* (d) around (d£, Acj) by increasing v* by At>, then
the difference in revenue is given by Xlfres At'(d/t - dj). Now. if ^.^(djt - rfj) > 0,
•^"P- S«.es(^ ~ <*fc) < 0. then we can increase, resp. decrease, w* until the tariff
function contains at least two points in (/, yielding at least as much revenue to the
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Theorem 3.5. Gtren is a set o/ c/tents A' and a stru?/f tari/f arc «nt/» o /urd
straieoy. 77»e oprtmai/ixed c/iarge tari/f/unrttori ran 6f /ound in O(»t'').
Proo/. Given is the set of all clients A', where | A"| = n, and the set of points I/. From
lemma 3.4 we know that the optimal fixed charge tariff function goes through at leant
two points in the set of points (/. Since |C| = n, we therefore need to t'onsider exactly
(2) = n(n — l)/2 tariff functions. For each of these fixed charge tariff functions, we
can calculate the revenue of the leader in 0(n). Evaluating the revenue for the lender
at all these possible lines allows us to find the optimal solution to our problem in
0(n*). •
3.2.7 Bounded Number of Commodities for R.TP
The river tarification problem is polynomial!)' solvable if the number of clients |A'| is
bounded from above by a constant. To see this, consider the following linear program,
where we suppose the path taken by each client in the network is known a priori and
denoted by pj. Recall that P* represents the aet of all passible paths taken by a
client Jfc G A' ,
'^ (3.32)
«.t. A,,(dfc)>Ap;(d*) Vfc€A-,Vp€Pfc
The formulation in (3.32) is a linear program for all pricing strategies studied.
Contrary to the network tarification problem, there are at most |T| + 1 paUis in
the network for each client. |Pjt| is thus bounded by |T| + 1. Hence, the number
of constraints is polynomial in the input data. Furthermore, the number of client
assignments to the tariff arcs is bounded by the number |T|' which is polynomial
in the input size if the number of clients is bounded from above. Therefore, if we
solve |T| instances of (3.32), which corresponds to the multi-commodity fixed path
tarification problem, we can retrieve the optimal solution. Since (3.32) is a linear
program, the optimal solution can be retrieved in polynomial time.
3.2.8 Special Cost Structure for RTP
For several special cost structures of the network, the river tarification problem is
polynomially solvable. These cost structures remind of the special combinatorial
structures of the distance matrix for the Travelling Salesman Problem (see Burkard,
Deineko, van Dal, van der Veen, and Woeginger [16], Lawler, Lenstra, Rinnooy-Kan,
and Shmoys [43]).
Denote for each commodity /c € A" the upper bound on the cost of the path from
Sfc to t/t by ut, fc € {1, • • •, |A"|}. For each node n € Af define a constant c,, > 0.
The cost of each fixed cost arc (i, j) is given by (CJ + Cj), except for the arcs («*, £fc)
which represent the upper bounds u/t. The source and target of each commodity is
furthermore connected to all tariff arcs. See Figure 3.8 for an example. In Figure 3.8,
the cost of getting to the tariff arc 1 from node Si is given by (ci + C3). We can now
transform the costs of fixed cost arcs such that the cost of using a tariff arc is the72 CHAPTER 3. COMPLEXITY
Figure 3.8: Special cost structure of network (|/f| = 2, |T| = 3).
same for all commodities, by incorporating the costs c«^ and e^ in the upper bound:
«fc •- Ufc — (c^ + r^). For this new instance, in an optimal solution all clients use
the Hiinic tariff arc. We can thus find the optimal solution of this special case of the
river tarilication problem by solving |7'| instances of the single arc linear tarification
problem.Chapter 4
Approximation
The first approximation result for the network tarification problem was presented
by Roch et al. [53] who showed that the network tarilkation problem with 11 single
client and a linear pricing strategy is approximablc with 0(log(|7'|)). In Section 4.1
we propose a |!T|-approximation algorithm for the cane with multiple clients, where
each client takes at most one tariff arc in the network (river tarifiention problem).
We show in Section 4.2 that the all-service network tarification problem presented in
Section 1.3.3 is inapproximable with 0(|T|'~^), unless ZPT = NT. See also Grigoriev
et al. [32]. In Section 4.3 we present some worst-case examples for several algorithms
based on the polynomial special cases of the network tarification problem described
in Chapter 3. For all results in this chapter we only consider a linear pricing strategy.
4.1 River Tarification Problem
We show that, in general, a uniform pricing strategy (uniform tarification) provides
a |T|-approximation for the river tarification problem with linear pricing strategies.
Whenever demands and costs on the arcs are polynomially bounded (in terms of |T|),
we improve this to an 0(log(|T|))-approximation.
We assume the network has a special structure, as described in Section 2.5.3.
Given the structure of the shortest path graph model, we may assume without loss
of generality that all fixed cost arcs incident with the target nodes have zero cost (by
adding their respective costs to the fixed cost arcs incident with the source node).
Moreover, since any path taken by a client involves exactly one fixed cost arc with
non-zero cost, we may assume without loss of generality that the costs of the fixed
cost arcs o€f are integral (by scaling, if necessary).
Due to the integrality of the costs of the fixed cost arcs, it is immediate that any
reasonable solution for the river tarification problem will adopt only tariffs which
are integral, too. Notice, however, that this is not true for the network tarification
problem, because a path chosen by a client can consist of several tariff arcs. There,
even if the costs of the fixed cost arcs are integral, it may be that an optimal solution
utilizes fractional tariffs (see Example 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Optimal fractional tariffs exist for the NTP.
Example 4.1. See the network of Figure 4.1. For this network, we are dealing with
a single client from .i to t, with unit demand. The tariff arcs are given by the dashed
arcs. One of the optimal solutions corresponds to setting the tariffs to uj = ^,t>2 = 2-
For convenience, the pricing strategy on the arcs is denoted by p,,(d) = w,,d, for
all tariff arcs o € 7" and by ($u(d) = c,,d, for all fixed cost arcs o e F.
4.1.1 |7'|-approxirnation Algorithm
We consider the uniform tarification problem (UTP), described in Section 2.2. Recall
that uniform tarification is the special case of the network tarification problem, with
the additional restriction that all tariffs are required to be identical. The pricing
strategy oh each tariff arc a £ 7' is therefore defined" as:
/»„(<*) = «<*. (4.1)
where v > 0 is identical for all tariff arcs. As shown in Section 3.2.2, the uniform
tarification problem can be solved in polynomial time, even in the general setting
where clients may use paths with several tariff arcs.
We nro interested in the loss that can be experienced by adopting a uniform
tarification policy. Therefore, denote by Fl''^'' the revenue for an optimal uniform
tarification, and by n"''^ the revenue for an optimal (not necessarily uniform) tari-
fication. By definition, rF™ < n°T
Lemma 4.1. //an optima/ <ari/tcation/or </ie river tari/icatiorj pro6/em unt/i revenue
II'-"*' ufi/iir.s a< most r di/ferent tarijffs, t/ien /or t/ie optima/ uni/orm tari/ication.
The proof of this lemma is indeed trivial once the structure of an optimal solution
to the river tarification problem is clear. To this end, consider an optimal non-uniform
tarification with tariffs «!<•••< t/|7-|, and let D* be the total demand on an arc a;
with tariff i>,, i 6 {1 |T|}. By £> = XZ'='i A we denote the total demand served
by the operator. Then the revenue created by this solution is the area under the
following 'staircase' function / : [0, D] —» [0, oo), illustrated in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2: Staircase function /(J) with inscribed rectangle.
Proo/o/Lemma ^.i. Consider any of the rectangle* in.scrib«>d under the graph of
function /(#), with area Tj := Vj • J2j>i ^j> *s depicted in Figure 4.2. Then it holds
that n^^^ > T, for all i € {1,..., |T|}, since the area of any such rectangle is a lower
bound for the revenue yielded by the optimal uniform tariff 11'" ''. This claim is true
because, starting with the optimal set of tariffs t»i,..., i>|j|, and levelling all tariffs to
some value u,, creates a revenue loss of at most 53^ <^ L^u* + ]Ci u >K ^t("t "">)•
(Notice that this does not hold for the network tarification problem.) Hence, if only
r different tariffs are utilized, we consider the r (inclusion-)maximal rectangles under
the function /, say T,,,..., 7},, and get r • II"™ > £^, T,^ > n"'T D
Since r < |T|, Lemma 4.1 yields the following theorem. Tightness of the result
will be shown below in Section 4.1.3, using Example 4.2.
Theorem 4.1. f/ni/orm tori/icahon is a |T|-approiimofton/or t/ie river <ari/ira(!ton
prt>6/em, and t/iis ftound is
4.1.2 0(log(|T|))-approximation Algorithm for Bounded Input
Data
We next derive an improved bound on the quality of uniform tarification policies for
the case of bounded input data. To this end, denote by t>,,,ax an upper bound on the
maximal possible tariff. For example, a trivial value for u,,,** is given by the maximal
cost of any fixed cost arc. Since we are dealing with a linear pricing strategy on all
arcs, Umax = maxagfc,. Then, if D is the total demand captured by the operator in
an optimal non-uniform tarification,
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Figure 4.3: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 4.2.
is a trivial upper bound for the optimal revenue for non-uniform tarification.
Lemma 4.2. // FI"^ is t/ie revenue /or on optimai tani/icatoon /or </ie river tari/i-
cation pro6/em, and [/ is f/ie upper bound on FI^"^ as de/ined in f^.5^, </ien /or t/ic
optima/ uni/orm <ari/ication, n'"''' > n™'*7(l + logt/)*.
Proo/. Indeed, we will even prove a slightly stronger result than claimed. First recall
the definition of the staircase function / in (4.2), as well as the inscribed rectangles,
with ureas 7', = »'r ]£_,>, Z?j. Let £ be the index of the maximal of these |T| rectangles,
with area 7>. Let x, := £V>, £>y = T,/iv. We show
n
l/TP (4.4)
" 1 + log(C//T,) '
Lemma 4.2 then follows, because we know that the optimal tariff only adopts
integral values, and T* > 1. To prove (4.4), we define the function
D-x
for x € [0, D). (4.5)
We claim that g(x) > /(x) for x e [0. D). To see this, take any x with
x < ^j<j Uj, then /(x) = Vi by definition. However,
»(*) = (4.6)
'With logx we denote the natural logarithm, i.e., e'°** = x.4.1. RJVER TARIFJCA77OJV PROBLEM 7T
where the first inequality follows by choice of x, and the last follows by choice of /
as the index of the largest rectangle.
Hence, the area under the staircase function, which equals FI'"'', can be upper
bounded in terms of the area defined by the function ,o(.r), as depicted in Figure 4.3.
To compute this area, we partition it into three parts, namely the rectangle 7> itself,
the area under y(x) on the domain x € [0, D - J>], as well as the area to tin- right
of y(x) on the domain r € [vf.fnmx]- The latter is the integral of the function
D - 5~'(v) = 7>/v on the domain [tv, Dm,,]. We thus obtain the following.
/ ^ / ?*. (4.7)
thus
logt>,-logx,]
< r,[l + logl/-log7»
. . < r,[l + log(t//7»], (4.8)
and since 7> < 1^"^, claim (4.4) follows. - D
Notice that claim (4.4) confirms the following geometric intuition: The closer
the staircase function /(x) is to the straight line x »-> (un,ax/D) . x, the closer 7/
is to t//4, which yields an approximation ratio of (1 + log 4) « 2.4 for uniform
tarification. Geometric intuition suggests a ratio of roughly 2, and the additional 0.4
is due to our analysis, caused by the difference between the functions o(x) and /(x).
In Section 4.1.4, we compare the quality of uniform versus non-uniform tarification
for the river tarification problem, based on numerical results for instances obtained
from France Telecom.
Theorem 4.2. // 6o</i demand per cZien< d/t, A; € {1,..., |if|}, and costs c« on t/ie
arcs a € F are po/j/nomia//j/ bounded in terms o/ |T| (Wie number o/ iarij^ ams,),
t/ien uni/orm tari/iicahon is an 0(log(|T|))-approxtmation /or t/ie riwr <ari/ica£ion
pro6Zem.
Proo/. Since d^ € poly(|T|) for all it and c« G poly(|T|) for all a e F, we have that
fmax € poly(|T|). Therefore, 1 + logf/ e 0(log(|T|)). Thus, from Lemma 4.2 the
theorem follows. D
4.1.3 Tightness of the Approximation
Finally, let us show tightness of the bounds in Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, and thus
also tightness of Theorem 4.1.
Example 4.2. Given |T| commodities and |T| tariff arcs. Every commodity is
operating its own subnetwork with just one tariff arc, that is, the entire network
consists of |T| disjoint subnetworks and each of them contains one commodity and78 CHAPTER 4. APPROXIMATION
Figure 4.4: The analysis of uniform tarification policies is tight.
one tariff arc. See also Figure 4.4. Fix an integer 6 > 2 and let the demand in
subnetwork A- be given by dj. = 6* - 6*"', it € {1, |T|}. This way, the total
demand /.) equals 6''I — 1. Moreover, the maximal revenue for subnetwork fc is
limited by a fixed cost arc («*,<*)> with cost c* = fc^m-*. Hence, the maximal tariff
"mnx equals 6^''' '.
In tin optimal solution, the tariff for each subnetwork it is set to its maximal
value, />-•'• *. Each subnetwork therefore contributes a revenue of 6^1 - 6^'"',
and II"''' = |T|(6^'I -6*1'•"'). The optimal uniform tarification consists in setting
the tariff on all tariff arcs to 6^'. This way, every unit of demand creates a profit of
6''', yielding a total revenue of 6*1'' - 6'''. Other (reasonable) uniform tariffs would
l>*> values *, A- € {1,..., |T| - 1}. When setting the uniform tariff to
only clients / < it are served. The revenue from these clients is equal to:
(4.9)
=i





Now, olxserve that in the optimal solution |r| different tariffs are utilized. Lem-
ma 4.1 (Theorem 4.1, respectively) suggests that uniform tarification provides a |T|-
apprnxinmtion. Example 4.2 proves that this is best possible, since 6 can be chosen
arbitrarily large.
Moreover. Lemma 4.2. respectively claim (4.4), suggests that uniform tarification
is a (1 + log(C//7>))-approximation. Here, 7> is the largest rectangle under the
function /; see the proof of Lemma 4.2. In Example 4.2, we have £/ = ()„„ • £> =
(6'"'"l - 1) • fc'W-i and 7> = 6*U1. We thus have t//7> = (6^' - l)/6. Hence,
(1 + log(C//7») = 1 + log(6^l - 1) - Iog6 < 1 + (|T| - 1)logb < |J|logfc, for 6 > 3.
Hence, for 6 > 3, Lemma 4.2 yields that uniform tarification is a |^-approximation
on this example (the hidden constant being log 6), while the same Example 4.2 shows•J.J. RIVER T.4RJFJCATJON PROBLEAf
























































that this is indeed best possible. Notice that this does not contradict th<> claim
of Theorem 4.2, since in Example 4.2 neither tariffs nor demands are polynomially
bounded in |T|.
Notice furthermore that the proofs we presented do not carry over straightfor-
wardly to the network tarification problem. The reason is that we made use of the
fact that any unit of demand utilizes at most one tariff arc. This is no longer true in
general.
4.1.4 Numerical Results
As stated previously, geometric intuition suggests a worst-case ratio for uniform tar-
ification of approximately 2. In this section, we present numerical results based on
several instances of the river tarification problem, obtained from FVance Telecom.
These instances represent telecommunication networks for the international inter-
connections market, one of the applications described in Section 1.2.
We compare the optimal solution using uniform tariffs (FI^'') to the solution
using non-uniform tariffs (11"'^ ). The value of the optimal non-uniform tarification
solution is calculated using the model and mixed integer programming formulation
described later on in Chapter 5. The value of 11^"' is calculated using the same
formulation, with the extra restriction that all tariffs should be equal. As such, we
do not compare the actual running times of both methods, but are more interested
in how efficient uniform tarification is for these instances.
Table 4.1 gives a description of each network, stating the number of nodes, arcs,
tariff arcs and clients. The value of the optimal solution found is given in the columns
with header n^''^ and IT"'^. The final column gives the approximation ratio as a
percentage of the optimal non-uniform solution. These results show that, for these
instances, uniform tarification yields on average 75% of the optimal non-uniform
tarification.80 CHAPTER 4. APPROXJMAT/ON
IVM-l
(a) INDKP. SET. (b) ALL-SERVICE RTP.
Figure 4.5: Reduction of INDEPENDENT SET to ALL-SERVICE RTP.
4.2 Inapproximability of the All-service NTP
In (his section, wo consider tho variation o/the netm>rlt t<ui/icatiuii pivibfcui wlieie tile
leader must capture the demand of all clients, i.e. service all clients in the network.
The all-service network tarification problem was described in Section 1.3.3. XtP-
hardness of this problem follows by our previous reduction presented in Section 3.1.2.
We show:
Theorem 4.3. For anj/ £ > 0, t/ie eztstenre o/ o poZynomiaZ ftme approximation
a/oortt/if/( /or- t/ic aZZ-servicc ne<u>or& tari/ication profcZem u>it/i |A'| cZients and |T|
' arcs
• untn u/orst cose ratio 0(|r|'^~") imp/ies T = NT;
• untfi worst cose ratio 0(|T|'~*) imp/ies XTT
• «rttn worst cose ratio 0(|A'|'^ ^) impZies ^ =
• witA worst case ratio Q(|A'|'^~') impZies
Prw>/. We present an approximation preserving reduction from INDEPENDENT SET
(see Carey and Johnson [31]) to the all-service river tarification problem. Since the
river tarification problem is a special case of the network tarification problem, this
proves the theorem.
Assume we are given a graph G = (V. £), and the problem is to find a maximum
cardinality sul>set V C V of vertices such that no two vertices in V are connected by
an «ige. The t ransformat ion works as follows. For every vertex v € V we introduce a
client with origin-destination pair {s,., t,.} and demand d,, = |£|, and a corresponding
tariff arc a,.. We connect the source s,, to the tail of the tariff arc a,,, and the head4.2. CVAPPKOXIMABJLITY OF THE ALL-SEJtVICE NTP 81
of a,, to the destination f,., using zero cost fixed cost arcs. Moreover, thoro is a fixed
cost arc (*,,<,.) with cost (|V| + 1) for all vertices t> 6 V. For every edge e € E wi>
introduce a client with origin-destination pair {.s,.,f,} and unit deinand. Tho upper
bound on the cost of routing thus demand is given by the fixed cost arc (»,, f,) with
cost 1. For all edges e 6 E and all vertices t> 6 V with t> 6 e\ we furthermore introduce
fixed cost arcs (A>,tail(a,.)) and (head(a,.),r,), with zero cost. This transformation
results in an instance of the all-service river tarification problem with |V| tariff arcs,
and |V| + |E| clients. Figure 4.5 gives an example of such a transformation for a
graph G = (V, E) with 3 nodes and 2 edges.
We claim that G has an independent set of cardinality at least A- if and only if
there exists a tariff policy for the all-service river tarification problem with a total
revenue of |V||E|(fc + 1) + |E|.
First, assume that G has an independent set V" of cardinality A\ For all »> € V,
set the tariff on the corresponding tariff arc a,, to |V| + 1, and all other tariffs to 1.
By the definition of an independent set, for any edge c = (v, u) € i? at least one of
the vertices, t> or u, is not in V". Therefore, the tariff of at least one of the tariff arcs,
Of or a,, is 1. All clients corresponding to an edge c can thus be served, using one
of the tariff arcs a,, or a,,. The clients (s,,,f,,) corresponding to the vertices t> 6 V
are also served, since the upper bound of |V| + 1 is not exceeded with the so-defined
tariffs. Hence, all clients are served. The revenue consists of |E| from all clients
corresponding to the edges E of G, |E|(|V| + l)fc from the clients corresponding to
the independent set V, and |E|(|V| - A;) from the clients corresponding to V \ V.
That yields a total revenue of |E||V|(Jfc + 1) + |E|.
Conversely, assume that there exists a set of tariffs that captures all demands,
such that the revenue is |E||V|(fc + 1) + |E|. We will show that this implies that
the graph G has an independent set of cardinality at least A;. Since all demands
are captured at this tarification strategy, for any edge e = (t;, u) G E, the tariff on
at least one of the arcs, a,, or a«, is 1. Consider the set of vertices V := {« €
V : *„„ > !}• By definition, no pair of nodes u,u € V" is connected by an edge.
Hence, V" is an independent set in G. Let A;' := |V'|. The revenue is equal to
|E| + |E|(|K| - fc') + |£|(|V| + 1)*' = |E||F|(A;' + 1) + |E|, which by assumption is at
least as large as |E||V|(A; + 1) + |E|. This implies that A;' > A; and thus that V is an
independent set in G of cardinality A;' > A;.
Now, let us assume that we have an Q-approximation algorithm .A for the all-
service river tarification problem, with a > 1. Consider any instance G = (V, E) of
INDEPENDENT SET, and the all-service river tarification problem resulting from the
above reduction. We can assume that both the optimal solution and the solution
produced by A only utilize tariff values 1 or |V| + 1, because any tariff greater
than 1 and not equal to | V| + 1 can be turned into |V| + 1 with a revenue gain. So
n°"" = |£?||V|(fc + 1) + |E| for some A:, and IT* = |E||F|(fc' + 1) + |E| for some A'.
The first part of the proof yields that the maximal independent set of G has size A;,
and algorithm A can be used to find an independent set of size at least A;'. Moreover,
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hence A^ > (fc + 1)/Q - 2. In other words, we have an 0(Q) approximation algorithm
for the INDEPENDKNT SKT problem.
It is now well known from work of Hastad [34] that the CLIQUE (see Garey and
Johnson [31]) problem in a graph G = (V, £), and hence also the INDEPENDENT SET
problem cannot have a polynomial time approximation algorithm with worst case
guarantee 0(|V|'/*"') unless 5" = >JT, and that it cannot have a polynomial time
approximation algorithm with worst case guarantee 0(|V|'~') unless Z3*P = NT.
Since the number of tariff arcs |T| in our transformation equals |Vj, the first two
claims of the theorem follow. Since the number of clients |A'| in our transformation
equals |V| + |E| £ 0(|V|-), the second two claims follow. For a description of the
class ZW, see Motwani and Raghavan [51]. D
4.3 Failing Approximation Algorithms for the NTP
Consider the polynomially solvable special cases described in Section 3.2. These
special cases can prove quite useful for approximation algorithms, as shown in Sec-
tion 4.1.1 for uniform tarification. Another example where a polynomially solvable
special case is successfully used in an approximation algorithm is in the paper by
Rorh H. al. [M]. They use the fixinl path linear tarification problem to obtain their
0(log(|7'|))-approximation algorithm of the single client network tarification problem.
In this section, we present worst-case examples for several algorithms which use
the previously mentioned polynomially solvable special cases. These algorithms were
developed while attempting to design an approximation algorithm for the network
tarification problem or the river tarification problem. The worst-case examples show
why they cannot serve this purpose.
From Section 3.2.1, we know that solving the network tarification problem with
linear pricing strategies is polynomially bounded by the number of clients, whenever
|T| is upper hounded a priori. Consider therefore the fr-tariff arcs algorithm, where
we solve the network tarification problem with linear pricing strategies for at most
fc < |T| tariff arcs. For this algorithm, the client thus takes at most ifc tariff arcs in
the network.
We define a network showing that the fc-tariff arcs algorithm can be arbitrarily
far from the optimal solution. For this network, we are dealing with a single client
with unit demand from node « to node f. The tariff arcs in T are the arcs a,,
t = {1,..., |T|}, while the fixed cost arcs are defined as follows: for all tariff arcs a^,
t = {1,..., |T|}, the cost of the fixed cost arcs from the source node s to the tariff
arc «, is set to (» — 1). while the cost of the fixed cost arcs from the tariff arc a, to
the target node f is set to (|T| - i). For each tariff arc a,, t = {1,..., |T|}, we define
furthermore a fixed cost arc from the tariff arc a< to the tariff arc Oj+i with cost
0. Finally, the cost of the arc (s,f) is set to |T|. See for example Figure 4.6, where
m = 5.
For this type of network, if a client takes a tariff arc, the revenue from that tariff
arc is at most 1. The cast of any path from s to / is bounded by the cast of the arc
(*. 0- Clearly, the optimal solution for the leader induces the client to take as many
tariff arcs as passible, i.e. the path through all tariff arcs, yielding a revenue of |JT|.4.3. FAILING APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR THE NTP
'•••!•..' v,. .•;••••'?
Figure 4.6: Worst-case network for fc-tariff arcs algorithm (|T| = 5, A; < |T|).
Figure 4.7: Worst-case network for null-path algorithm.84 r CHAPTERS APPROXIMATION
For the Jk-tariff arcs algorithm, the optimal solution will yield a revenue of fc, since it
is optimal to take aH many tariff arcs as possible (at most Jt), each tariff arc yielding
a revenue of 1.
If we denote the optimal revenue by II''"**' and the revenue achieved by the fc-tariff
arcs algorithm by Il/cr/*, the ratio
shows that we can makn the approximation error of the fc-tariff arcs algorithm on the
type of network aw depicted in Figure 4.6 as large as necessary, by taking |T| = /(fc),
where /(it) is a function of fc, such that |T| is large enough.
As shown in Section 3.2 and by Labbe et al. [41], the fixed path linear tarification
problem can also be solved in polynomial time. One approximation algorithm we
could consider is to optimize the tariffs on the path for which the upper bound on
the revenue is highest. This corresponds to optimizing the tariffs on the path taken
by the client when all tariffs are zero (the null-path). Figure 4.7 shows that this
in indeed also not a good approximation algorithm. Indeed, optimizing the revenue
over the null-path yields a revenue of at most 2. However, any path taking only one
tariff arc can yield an optimal revenue of (A/ - 1).Chapter 5 i
Optimizing a Linear Pricing
Strategy
In this chapter we describe single-level formulations of the network tarificat ion prob-
lem with multiple clients and linear pricing strategics. We consider a loniiiiialion
using path variables, a formulation using arc variables, and a formulation using a
combination of both arc and path variables. A branch and bound algorithm using
path variables is furthermore proposed. Numerical results show the efficiency of ap-
plying the solution methods to the shortest path graph model instead of the original
network.
5.1 Problem Formulations
Consider the following bilevel formulation of the network tarification problem, as
defined in Chapter 2. The upper level relates to the leader and fixes the tariffs, the
lower level belongs to the clients, who given the tariffs set by the leader, determine
their best (shortest) path. •. ,- •,,,..•,,., . v-\-.•:-.•• :•. ••;. " • M
max £ *>;(<**)
a.t. p£ € arg min Ap(d*) V& G A" * '
p€ Pt . :••.•••.-
Since we assume demands are known a priori, both objective functions are linear
in the tariffs and hence we are dealing with a linear-linear bilevel program. Notice
furthermore that the bilevel program given by (5.1) is not polynomial in its input
data, since the set of all possible paths for each client fc G A may be exponential.
As we are considering only linear pricing strategies, recall from Chapter 2 that
the cost of routing a demand on a tariff arc a € T is given by /?„(</) = w,,d. The cost
of routing a demand on a fixed cost arc a G F is defined by <5a(d) = c<,d. Labbe et al.
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[41] rewrite the path oriented formulation (5.1) to the following arc oriented bilevel







and let the vector y* € R'^' represent the flow on the arcs, for commodity fc € A".
Define furthermore by i+, respectively t", the outgoing arcs, respectively, incoming
arcs of node f € TV. Consider the following bilevel program for the network tarification
problem, using arc-variables:
max 53 E w«<*H/«
"»" E | E ««»£'
s.e. E Vo - E J/O = **
v! >0
A',Vi e N (5.3)
Va € T
The object ive function of the upper level maximizes the revenue of the leader. The
objective function of the lower level problem finds a shortest path in the network for
each client. Both objective functions are bilinear, i.e. they are linear with respect to
each of two variables. For the single-commodity case, primal-dual heuristics based on
a penalization of the lower level objective function in (5.3) are proposed by Brotcorne
et al. [13]. These heuristics were extended to multiple commodities in Brotcorne et al.
[14].
5.1.1 Arc Formulation
Labbe et al. [41] have shown that it is possible to formulate the bilevel model described
in (5.3) as a mixed integer program. To arrive at this formulation, note first that
for fixed values of the tariffs »\,, a € 7\ the lower level problem is a linear program.
For each client A; € A', this linear program solves a shortest path problem. For the
lower level problem, the optimal solution can be described by linear programming
optimally conditions (primal mid dual feasibility, and equality of the primal and
dual objective function, see Chvatal (18]):5.1. PROBLEM FORAfl/LATJOJVS ' • ^ 87
E y«- E y« = ^ vjbeAT.Vie
Q€I+ a€«"
A*-Af<Va V*eA*,Va =
A, -A*<c« VitGA',Va =
E v.»* + E ca»* = A*, - A^ VJb G A' ^
a€T o€F
y* >0 VifcG A'.Voe
r« > 0 Va G T
Replacing the lower level problem in (5.3) by its optiniality conditions (5.4) yields
the following (nonlinear) single-level formulation:
max E E "a
«•*• E^ya-Ey« = ^ vfcGAT.vie^
A|-Af<^ VA:GA-,Va=(i,j)GT
A*-Af<Ca Vfce A",Va= (t,j)gF ^"'^
E ^oy« + E Caya = A{; - Aj; VA: e A"
o€T a€F
y« >0 „, ' VA:G A'.VaG A
Ua >0 ' ,^ . VaGT
The formulation given in (5.5) is bilinear, due to the product Uaj/J in the objective
function and the duality gap constraint. We can however linearize this term by
introducing the variable u£ for all clients A; G A" and all tariff arcs a G T. This
variable is equal to i><,ya if and only if the client A: G A" takes the tariff arc a G T.
This relationship is achieved by the constraints:
where the constant M is large enough. Note that the variables j/* G {0,1} for all
tariff arcs a6T and clients ifceA". This yields the following mixed integer program.CHAPTER 5. OPTIMIZING A LINEAR PRICING STRATEGY
max 53 E "*<
«•*• E v£ - E v« = *>* vfce AT,V» G N
A*-A*<Va V*€ A:,Va = (i,j)GT
A*<c« Vfce A',Va = (i,./•)eF
E * + E c«y* = A*, - Aj, Vfc 6 A" (5.7)
a67' off
U l/i 6(0.1} V*eAT,VaeT
y* >0 ' VlfcG A\Va6f ^
«a >0 VaGT
Recently, Dewez [25] considered valid inequealities for the formulation given in
(5.7). Moreover, in Dcwez [25] bounds for the A/ constant are computed for each
constraint that are as small as possible. We will refer to the single-level mixed integer
program of LabM et al. [41], given in (5.7), in the remainder of this thesis as AMIP.
We can use Chf sAortest pa<!ft grapft rnovfei' o/Sectf«wr j?.5 m <sn «nr owwwiteuf rn\3«ta'
by applying the formulation AMIP of Labbe et al. [41]. To this end, we define an
SPGM for each client A- € A', as explained in Section 2.5. We create a multiple
commodity mixed integer program by first, allowing the tariffs on each tariff arc of
the shortest path graph model to be different for each commodity, i.e. to allow for
price discrimination and maximize the revenue of the leader over all commodities.
We then prohibit, price discrimination by setting tariffs on the arcs of each SPGM
equal to each other if they represent, the same tariff arc in the original network. We
will refer to the adaptation of the formulation AMIP to the shortest path graph model
as AMIP+.
5.1.2 Path Formulations
We rewrite the bilevel formulation given in (5.1) to the following single-level program,
using path variables. To this end, we introduce the binary variable Zip which indicates
whether or not a given path is taken in the optimal solution.
E *P = i vifc e «•
> E V,(dk) W € A',Vp e
€{o,i} , MeA.
>0 Vo€T5.1. PROBLEM FORAfULAT/ONS . 88
The first constraint in formulation (5.8) indicates that a client selects only one
path in the network, since the variables /i,, are binary. The second constraint ensures
that the path taken by the client is indeed the cheapest available path. Note that
the bilevel formulation (5.8) is not only nonlinear in its objective function, but also
in this constraint. We can linearize the formulation (5.8) by introducing the variable
rpo for each path p € P/t, and tariff arc o € T. The variable r^ is equal to t\,d* if
and only if client A- € A' takes the path p € P* going through the tariff arc o € 7'
and is equal to 0 otherwise. After adding the constraints enforcing this relationship,
we can write the following mixed integer programming formulation. We will refer to




-(1 - /ip)A/ < r,» - w<,dfc < (1 - /ip)A/ VA: £ A', Vp e P*. Va € Tp
^p€ {0,1} VJfc 6 AT,VpGPfc
Uo > 0 Va € T
Note that for the PMIP, we are in theory still left with an exponential number
of constraints. However, the remodeling of the network proposed in Section 2.5,
combined with the model specific graph reduction methods, will allow us to generate
the relevant paths for each commodity and thus reduce the necessary variables and
constraints to a manageable amount.
Recently, Didi, Marcotte, and Savard [26] have proposed another single-level for-
mulation using path variables. To arrive at this formulation, they introduce the
variables II* and A*' for all clients A; e A". II* corresponds to the revenue per unit of
demand to the leader from client A" € A' and A* to the total cost per unit of demand
of the path taken by client A; € A'.
If for the client A: e A" we denote the path taken in the optimal solution by
p* € P/t, we must have that:
Va and A* = II* + V c«, • (5.10)
for the optimal solution. Since the clients can only take one path in the optimal
solution we have that:
«, •:-•: (5.11)96 CHAPTER 5. OPTIMIZING A LINEAR PRICING STRATEGY
This yields the following single-level formulation, using path variables: • •
max E E
«.<. n* < £ ««+ Mt(i - ftp) vp € Pfc, v* e A:
E "a + E Ca - A/fc(l - ftp) < A* Vp € Pfc.VJfc 6 A"
A* = n* + E /»P E Co vjfc e A:
p€/\ a€/>
E V = 1 Vfc € A"
v« >o Voer
ftp €{0,1} VfcGAT.VpePfc
For the formulation in (5.12), setting tlie viilues ftp.p € P/t to the optimal path for
each client A; € A', yields the desired values of Fl*" and A*, given in (5.10).
5.1.3 Arc-Path Formulation
Didi et al. [26] have developed a single-level formulation for the network tarification
problem, thtit combines both arc and path variables. To arrive at their formulation,
denote, by /* the set of paths from /\ that contain the arc a € A:
/* = (P e flbla € p}, VoeA,VAr€A'. (5.13)
Consider the single-level program AMIP using arc-variables given in (5.7). For AMIP
the opt imality conditions of the lower level program are the primal and dual feasibility
and duality-gap constraints. Didi et al. [26] replace these constraints by the following
optimality constraints:
E >»P = i V* € A: •
0 < «a < A/(l - E M V* € A',Vo € A,
where a,, is a slack variable for each arc a € A and the other variables are as denned
previously for AMIP and PMIP. The first constraint in (5.14) ensures that the client
only takes one path in the optimal solution. The other three constraints ensure that
the path taken by the client is indeed the shortest path in the network. To see this,
consider the last constraint in (5.14) and suppose the client it € A' takes the shortest
path p* containing the arc a* 6 A. In that case, the corresponding slack variable «„•
is equal to zero and the second and third constraint in (5.14) read, for all arcs on the
pathp*:5.2. BRANCH AND BOt/ND , 91
" i ^» ~~ f'O "" t ^» j Vfl ^— 11 f J I t V • . • • ' •
For all arcs in the network the second and third containts read: '
Af - Af < Co VJfc € A, Va = (i, j) e F ^' ^
The constraints in (5.15) and (5.16) show that the path ;»* is indeod the shortest
path in the network for the given costs and tariffs.
The flow on the arc a € A is equal to one if and only if there exists a path ;> € /*'
such that /ip = 1. Furthermore, since a client can take only one path in the network,
we have:
„* = V /»,, V* G A\ Va G A. . • (5.17)
Thus, for AMIP, the constraints (5.6) are furthermore replaced by the constraints:
0 < «5 < A/« S /ip V* € A,Va € T
pe/J (5.18)
^<Ua VJfc€ A'.VaeT,
where A/,,, a € A are constants large enough. This yields the following single-level
formulation, using arc and path variables.
max X] Z)
Vfce AT,Va = (i,j)er
Vfc€ /f,Va=(i,j)eF





^ > 0 Va € T
5.2 Branch and Bound
In this section we describe a branch and bound algorithm (see Ahuja, Magnanti, and
Orlin [1]) for the network tarification problem which uses the shortest path graph
model from Section 2.5 and its reduction methods. This algorithm consists of two
steps. In the first step we create for each client a shortest path graph model and
apply to it the reduction methods of Section 2.5.2. For each client fc G A we then find92 CHAPTER 5. OPTIMIZING A LINEAR PRICING STRATEGY
the relevant shortest paths, denoted by P*, by enumerating all paths in the shortest
path graph model. In step two we solve the problem to optimality by a classical
branch and bound method.
Recall from Chapter 2 the linear function Ap(d) = 7p(d) + 7Tp(d) denoting the
cost of a path p as a function of all tariff values. Let /* be the path for client fc € A'
with the smallest fixed cost, i.e., /* = argminpg/v 7p(d/i) and u* the path with the
largest fixed cost, i.e., u* = argmax^gp^ 7p(d/t). Note that u^ has no revenues for
the lender, since it denotes the path with fixed cost arcs only. As defined earlier in
Section 2.4, 7,^. (rl) - 7^ (d) is an upper bound on the revenues that can be generated
from client fc. This is an important measure in the branch and bound algorithm.
5.2.1 Branching Rules
In each node of the branch and bound tree, we select a client, and we create a branch
for each of the relevant, paths of the client. The selection criterium of the clients is
based on the upper bound on the revenue generated by each client for the leader:
the client for which this upper bound is highest, is selected first. See Section 5.2.2
for the exact upper bound calculation used. Next, we walk through the search tree
in a depth-first manner. See also Figure 5.1 for a graphical representation of the
branching rules.
5.2.2 Node Processing
In each node of the branch and bound tree for some clients the path taken in the
solution is fixed, whereas for other clients this choice is still to be made. In each
node, we denote by the set A'/ C A' the set of clients for which we have fixed the
path taken in the solution. Suppose that for any client fee A'/, the path taken in
the optimal solution is the path p£. We can find the optimal, revenue maximizing




.«•<• Ap(d*)>Ap;(<4) Vfce A'/.VpeP/t.
The linear program described in (5.20) forces the path p£ to be the shortest path
in /\, while maximizing the leader's revenue.
We generate lower bounds in each node of the branch and bound tree by comput-
ing a feasible solution. Such a feasible solution can be created by solving (5.20) and
then adding the revenues from the tariffs of (5.20) for the clients in A"\A'/. A better
lower bound may be generated by fixing for all clients the path taken in the solution.
For each client it € A'/ we already know which path is taken in the solution and we
denote it by pj. Fbr the clients it € A'\A'/, we fix the path to the one for which the







, Rx path taken







Figure 5.1: Branching rules for branch and bound algorithm.CHAPTER 5. OPTIMIZING A LINEAR PRICING STRATEGY
max X! *>;(<**)+ £ %
VfcATVP (5.21)
Ap(dt) > A,,(<fc) Vfc e AT\AT/,Vp € P*
«„ > 0 VaeT
Note that this linear program may be infeasible in which case no sensible lower
bound i.s generate!.
For a client A; € A' an upper bound for the revenue generated by that client is
given by 7u^(dfc) - 7/ (d*). AH shown by Labbe et al. [41], this upper bound is not
necessarily reached. Even the upper bound on the cost of the path, 7u^(d), is not
tight, an shown by the Example 2.1 of Chapter 2.
In each node of the branch and bound tree, let II* be the optimal value of (5.20),
i.e., the optimal revenue obtained from the commodities with fixed paths. The re-
maining clients can contribute no more than
£ {7ut(«**)-7/fc (<**)}• (5.22)
An upper bound on the total revenue for the leader in a node is thus given by:
(5-23)
This upper bound can be tightened by using the information we can retrieve
from the constraints of the linear program given by (5.20). These constraints must
b«- satisfied by any feasible solution, for all clients and their relevant paths. Thus,
the constraints of (5.20) also hold for the clients for which a path is not fixed yet, as
can be wen from the constraints in (5.21). Each of the constraints in (5.20) involves
two paths, say /> and q, and states that the total cost of one path (say p) is at most
the total cost of the other path (say q): Ap(d) < A,(d). Now, let Tp be the set of
tariff arcs on path ;>. The constraint reads in more detail
or equivalently,
T \7\ •'« c*" k** bounded from above, then we have an upper bound on the
sum of a set of tariffs. For instance, if T,\Tp is empty, then we get zero as a trivial
upper bound. Thus, this way we find a number of constraints of the type5.3. NUMERICAL RESULTS ' 96
fc (*€/), (5.26)
where 6, is a constant for t € /. Each of the constraints in (5.26) gives an upper
bound on the sum of the tariffs for the arcs in the set 7',, i € /. Thus, if n client lakes
a path using a (sub)set of T,, it is possible to upper bound the cost of taking that
path for the client. Consider therefore a path p e P* from commodity A- € A'\A'/,
i.e., a commodity for which no path has been fixed yet. An upper bound on the
total cost per demand was previously given by the path using only fixed arcs, i.e. the
path ">u£- With the constraints of type (5.26) obtained from the clients in A"/ and
by defining 6, = 0 for T, = 0, the upper bound on the total cost of a path j> € Pfc,
denoted by T(p), is given by:
T(p)= min (7,,(dfc) + Mk) Vfc e A'\A/,Vi>€ ft (5.27)
For each commodity fr € A", the total cost of each path taken in a solution can
be at most the minimum cost of all other possible paths for that commodity. Hence,
an upper bound on the total cost of any path in P*. is given by:
minT(p) (5.28)
For each commodity fc (E AT, the upper bound on the revenue is still highest for
the path with smallest fixed cost, i.e. the path /*• We can thus improve the upper
bound computation given in (5.23) by using thefollowing upper bound:
(5.29)
We will use the upper bound calculation of (5.29) for our branch and bound
algorithm.
5.3 Numerical Results
The branch and bound algorithm (PBB) was implemented in C++, using CPLEX
7.5 (see CPLEX [22]) to solve the linear programs as described in (5.20) in each node
of the tree. The formulations AMIP, AMIP+ and PMIP were also implemented in
C++, using CPLEX 7.5.
The solution methods developed in this chapter were tested on two types of data
sets. The first type is a set of instances provided by France Telecom Research and
Development and represents real life instances of the network tarification problem as
occurring for France Telecom at the international level. In these instances, the graph
represents a telecommunications network and the tariff arcs are the interconnections
between the different operators. The clients are large corporations who wish to route
their (international) demand on the network. A description of these real life instances
is given in Table 5.1, where, for each data set, we describe the number of nodes and96 CHAPTER 5. OPTIMIZING A LINEAR PRICING STRATEGY
arcs in the network, the number of tariff arcs and the number of clients. All tables
can be found in Section 5.4.
The second typo of data set consists of randomly generated graphs. A graph
(7 = (N, A) was generated by taking a random subset of the edges of the complete
graph A'n. For each edge, we created two arcs, one for each direction between the
two nodes. The tariff arcs are assigned randomly. The cost on each fixed cost arc was
uniformly generated from [20,100]. The source and destination of each demand were
assigned randomly. The demand of each commodity was uniformly generated from
[l,30j. These instances are much larger than the real life instances, and are used to
illustrate what happen* with each algorithm when the number of (tariff) arcs or the
number of clients in the network increases. Each of these data sets has a name of
the form '.rTj/D', where .r represents the number of tariff arcs and j/ the number of
clients in the network. Moreover, for the randomly created instances, each data set
referred to as 'I7'J/D' actually consists of 5 instances. Statistics or execution times of
a data set 'rT{/D' are averages over all 5 instances created. Hence, each implemented
formulation has been tested on a total of 165 random instances.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the shortest path graph model, Table 5.2 and
Table T).,'} show some statistics on the number of paths generated for each data set
using the shortest path graph model and its reduction methods for both type of
data sets. In these two tables, the column MlN, resp. MAX, indicates the minimum,
resp. maximum, number of paths generated over all commodities. The column AVRG
gives the average number of patlis generated for each commodity for the whole data
set. As stated previously, in Table 5.3 the value of MlN, MAX and AVRG for each
data set is an average over the 5 instances used. We can see from these two tables
the competitiveness of the shortest path graph model and its reduction methods by
the small number of patlis generated on average for the given data sets. With this
information we can expect the PBB algorithm and the PMIP formulation to benefit
from this small number of paths for each commodity.
The performance of the shortest path graph model was tested using the PBB
algorithm, the PMIP and AMIP+ formulations and compared to the mixed integer
programming formulation AMIP of Labbe et al. [-41], which uses the original arcs in
the network and all tariff arcs available.
The computational results for the PBB algorithm, AMIP, AMIP+ and PMIP were
establisluxl on IUI AMD Athlon 2400XP+ with 1 Gb of RAM, running Debian Linux
3.0 with kernel 2.4.18. For the AMIP+ formulation, the arcs generated by the shortest
path graph model were used instead of the original arcs in the network. For the
PMIP and the PUB algorithm, the size of the set Pj, for each commodity Jfc 6 A' was
determined by the number of patlis generated by the shortest path graph model and
its reduction techniques. As can be seen from Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, for ah* data
sets this resulted on average iu a small number of constraints for each commodity.
Table 5.4 gives an overview of the results for all algorithms for the real life in-
stances. In this table, the column OPT indicates the value of the optimal solution for
the given data set. The column CPU(s). resp. Nodes, indicates the execution time in
seconds, resp. the number of nodes in the B&B tree for each algorithm. For the PBB
algorithm, the PMIP and the AMIP+, the CPU time includes the time needed for the5.3. N(/Af£RICAL RESl/LrS . 97
generation of the shortest path graph model and all relevant paths. As can be seen
in Table 5.4. the PBB algorithm efficiently uses the few relevant paths generated to
find the optimal solution for each data set. When we compare its execution to the
AMIP, we see that the execution time of the PBB algorithm is less or equal to the
running time of CPLEX for the AMIP for each data set considered. The difference
is especially large for the data sets D2, D3, D6. D7 and D8. The most striking dif-
ference is for the data set D3, for which the execution time of the AMIP is 113423
seconds, whereas the PBB algorithm takes only 30 seconds. The PMIP and AMIP+
columns show the efficiency and power of the shortest path graph model used. The
execution time of the PMIP is 3 seconds or less for all data sets, except the data set
D6. For this data set the execution time is however still nnicli less than the execution
time of the AMIP and less than the time needed for the Pun algorithm to execute.
The AMIP+ column shows furthermore that the AMIP formulation can benefit very
much from the shortest path graph model: for all data sets, the time needed for the
AMIP+ formulation is a little more than the time needed for the PMIP formulation
and much less than the time needed for the same formulation on the original network
(AMIP).
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 illustrate the behaviour of all formulations developed for
randomly generated networks and show what happens when we increase the number
of tariff arcs or clients in the network. For these instances, the CPU time of the
PMIP, AMIP and AMIP+ does no( include the time needed for the shortest, path
graph model. This value is given in the column SPGM. The maximal execution time
for each solution method was set to 3600 seconds. If for a certain formulation or
algorithm an instance could not be solved within this time, the column CPU indicates
the number of instances where the time limit was exceeded, while the column Nodes
gives the average percentual gap between the best (optimal) solution as found by any
of the other algorithm within the time limit. All instances were solved to optimality
by both the PMIP or AMIP+ formulation.
The numerical results for the random instances show that the performance of
the algorithms developed is consistent with the numerical results for the real life
instances: the PMIP and AMIP+ are the fastest, followed by respectively the PBB
and AMIP. For the PMIP, AMIP+ and PBB algorithms, the numerical results show
also that the time needed for the generation of the SPGM is the largest part of
the execution time of the algorithm. When the size of the network increases, the
shortest path graph model takes more time to generate, but its execution time is more
dependent on the number of shortest paths that need to be calculated (depending on
the number of tariff arcs or clients in the network) than on the size of the network each
shortest path calculation is executed on. The execution time of the SPGM increases
when the number of clients is increased, but is especially sensitive to the number
of tariff arcs in the network. We can furthermore conclude that although the time
needed for the SPGM generation increases when the number of tariff arcs or clients
increases, the AMIP+ and PMIP formulation still use the information generated by
the shortest path graph model very efficiently when compared to the PBB algorithm
or AMIP formulation, where an increase in the number of clients in the network is
soon a problem. For example, for the networks with 100 nodes and 2000 arcs, the96 CHAPTER 5. OPTIMIZING A LINEAR PRICING STRATEGY
data set 90T50D, consisting thus of 90 tariff arcs and 50 clients, cannot be solved
in 4 out of 5 instance* for the PBB algorithm and 5 out of 5 instances for the AMIP
formulation.
W<! can also note that although the PMIP and AMIP+ are much faster than the
PBB algorithm and the AMIP, the advantage of the PBB algorithm over the PMIP,
AMIP+ and AMIP is that it does not need a powerful mixed integer programming
solver. Since very basic techniques have been used both with respect to concept and
implementation, there is still room for improvement on this algorithm.5.4. TABLES
5.4 Tables
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We extend the results obtained in Chapter 5. by considering pricing strttl^fei which
are commonly found in telecommunication networks. For the operator of a network,
choosing a pricing strategy is an important part of his overall strategy. This decision
may depend on (contradictory) economic and marketing factors: A pricing strategy
that maximizes the revenue of the operator may not be very easy to understand for
the user and thus not very easy to market.
Our model focuses on the economic aspect of the decision process. We show
that it is possible to optimize the revenue of the operator for all pricing strategies
considered. Using the results of numerical tests on a set of real life instances, we
interpret the impact of each pricing strategy on the revenue for the operator and on
the clients.
6.1 Model Fnr ^ii^. , i
We consider the variant of the network tarification problem, where the pricing strat-
egy on the arcs is not restricted to a linear pricing strategy only (see Section 1.3.1
and Section 2.2). All pricing strategies are nonnegative, nondecreasing functions in
the demand d denoted by the function p,,(d) for all arcs a € T. The function p,,(d)
on an arc a € T is a piecewise linear (not necessarily continuous) function. For all
pricing strategies, the cost of routing no demand on the arc is zero.
The pricing strategies we consider are given in Figure 6.1. As we can see from this
figure, for each pricing strategy, each linear piece of a pricing strategy must adhere to
certain additional restrictions. For example, for the inclusive minutes pricing strategy
(see Figure 6.1(c)), the pricing strategy has two linear pieces, where the first linear
piece is constant in the demand rf. For a formal definition of each pricing strategy,
we refer to Section 2.2 on page 32.
The operator's optimization problem can be modelled by the following bilevel
105106 CHAPTER 6. OPTIA/IZING ALL PRICING STRATEGIES
(a) Linear (b) Fixed Charge (c) Inclusive Minutes
(d) Piece wine Linear (e) Staircase
Figure 6.1: Pricing strategies.6.2. PROBLEA/ FORAf l/LATJONS ; ' 10?
formulation of the network tarification problem using path variables.
max £ *>;(^*r)
a.t. pj = arg min Ap(djt) Vifc € A*. ' ' '
Since the demand of each client is known a priori, the revenue function 7r,,(rf) and t ho
path length function A,,(d) in (6.1) are linear in the tariffs, for all pricing strategies.
Formulation (6.1) is thus a linear-linear bilevel formulation.
The bilevel formulation (5.3) using arc variables, which holds for a linear pricing




In this bilevel model, we use the same notation as in Chapter 5. The cost of routing
a demand d on a tariff oGTis given by />,,(d). The cost of routing a demand d on
a fixed cost arc a 6 F is given by <5,,(d). The vector j/*' € R'^' represents flow on the
arcs, for commodity fc € A'. For each node z € AT, 6f indicates whether the node is a
supply or demand node.
We propose several methods to solve the network tarification problem for all
pricing strategies in Figure 6.1 to optimality. These methods are based on single-
level formulations of (6.1) and (6.2) and on a generalization of the branch and bound
algorithm proposed in Chapter 5.
6.2 Problem Formulations
The mixed integer problem (MIP) formulations of the network tarification problem
related to each pricing strategy that we propose are generalizations of the arc formu-
lation AMIP and the path formulation PMIP described in Chapter 5.
6.2.1 Arc Formulation
The leader's and follower's objective function in (6.2) contain the (nonlinear) product
^..(ditjy* for all arcs a € T and clients fc € A\ Since the demands are known a priori,
this product is bilinear: It is linear with respect to the flow variables and linear with
respect to the tariffs. Whenever the pricing strategy is fixed, the lower level problem
consists of solving |A'| independent shortest path problems. The bilevel formulation
(6.2) can thus be written as a single level problem, by replacing the lower level linear
program by its optimality conditions: primal and dual feasibility, and the duality108 CHAPTER 6. OPTIMIZING ALL PRICING STRATEGIES
gap constraint (see Chvatal [18]). This yields the following single-level (nonlinear)
formulation:
*•<•
A} - Af </»„(«**) :• VA€A:,Vo = (i,j)eT (6.3)
AJ-A? <«„(**) VfceAT,Va = (i,j)eF
£ P.(«fc)lrf + £ «.(«**)«£ = A?, - A^ VA: € A'
>0 VJfc€A\VaeA
The formulation given in (6.3) is nonlinear, due to the product p,,(d/t)y* in the
objoctivo function and the duality gap constraint. Since the demand of each client
is known a priori, we linearize this term by introducing the variable p* for all tariff
area a € T and all clients it 6 A". The variable p£ is equal to /Ja(dfc) if and only if
client A; € A" takes the tariff arc a. This relationship is achieved by the constraints:
where the constant A/ is large enough, and the variables y£ € {0,1} for all tariff arcs
o € T and clients fc € A". This yields the following mixed integer program.
<i€7'
vi: - E vi = *? vfc € A-, vi 6
PS + E *-(*)»* = Af, - A*. VAreAT
p* < Afy* Vfc€ A",
6.2.2 Path Formulation ,
The bilevel formulation (6.1) using path variables, can be written as the following
single-level formulation: , •••6.2. PROBLEM FORAJl/LATJONS 109
max 53 £ ^p
£ /»,, = 1 V* € A*
(6.6)
/>p€ {0,1} VJfc€ tf,Vp6 Pfc
For the single-level formulation in (6.6), the binary variable /i,, indicates whether
or not a given path is taken in the optimal solution. The first constraint in (6.6)
therefore guarantees that a client selects only one path. The second constraint ensures
that the path taken by the client is indeed the cheapest available path. The demands
are known a priori, thus the functions 7Tp(d/t) and A,,(d/t) are linear in the tariffs. The
products /jp7Tp(djt) and /ipAp(d*) are therefore nonlinear. The formulation given in
(6.6) is thus nonlinear in its objective function and in the second constraint, for all
pricing strategies.
We linearize the formulation given in (6.6) by replacing the nonlinear product
/ipP<i(d*:) embedded in the objective function and in the second constraint by the
variable rpa for all paths p € P* and tariff arcs a g I for a client A: e A'. The
variable rpa is equal to p<j(<4) ^ and only if the client A: € A' takes the path p € P/t
going through the tariff arc a 6 T, and is equal to zero otherwise. This relationship
is achieved by the following constraints:
where the constant A/ is large enough. We can thus write the bilevel formulation
(6.1) as the following linear mixed integer program, for all pricing strategies.
E E ^
p6Pfca€Tp
S.t. £ ftp = 1 VJfc € A
E E M»(^)+ E £ *v vfceAT.Vpe
€F, <?€P«,o€T,
M40 + E ^(40 Vfc € AT,Vp €
0<rpo</ipM VJfce AT.VpePjt.VaeT
-(1 - /ip)M < r^ - pjdfc) < (1
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6.3 Branch and Bound
We show in this section that the branch and bound algorithm described in Chapter 5
can easily be adapted to hold for all pricing strategies studied. The algorithm consists
of two steps: In the first step, the relevant paths are generated using the shortest
path graph model of Section 2.5, while in the second step the network tarification
problem is solved to optimality by using a classical branch and bound algorithm.
6.3.1 Branching Rules
The branching rules apply already for all pricing strategies: In each node of the
branch and bound tree, we select a client, and we create a branch for each of the
relevant paths of tin- client. The selection method of the clients is based on the upper
bound on the revenue generated by each client for the leader. The client for which
this upper bound is highest, is selected first. Next, we walk through the search tree
in a depth-first manner.
6.3.2 Node Processing
In each node of the branch and bound tree for some clients the path taken in the
solution is fixed, whereas for other clients this choice is still to be made. Denote
by the set A'/ C A' the set of clients for which we have fixed the path taken in the
solution. We generate lower bounds in each node of the branch and bound tree by
computing a feasible solution. Such a feasible solution is created by fixing for all
clients the path taken in the solution. For each client fc € A'/ we already know which
path is taken in the solution and we denote it by p£. For the clients fc € A'\A'/, we fix
the path to the one for which the passible revenue is highest. This is the path with
smallest fixed cost, i.e. the path /*. The tariffs are determined using the following
linear program:
max 51 *p.(dfc)+ £ *•/•.(<**)
fc6K"\K,
>Ap;(dfc) V*€A',,VpePjt (<>.9)
> A^(dfc) V* € A'\A'/,Vp G P*
Let. II* be the optimal revenue obtained from the clients in the set A'/, whose path




The remaining clients can contribute no more than6.4. RESULTS 111
where Tu^d*) - 7/ (d/t) is the upper bound on the revenue per client. An upper
bound on the total revenue for the leader in a node is thus given by:
lt€lf\#i/
In Chapter 5, the upper bound calculation in a node was refined s|>ecifically for
a linear pricing strategy. For the other pricing strategies considered in t his chapter,
this upper bound refinement is invalid. It is furthermore diflicult to lind such a
tailored upper bound calculation which holds for all pricing strategics. We will thus
use the more general upper bound calculation (6.12).
6.4 Results
To obtain some insight in the consequences for the players in the network tarification
problem (operator and clients) of using all the different pricing strategies defined,
we try to answer the following questions. What is the best pricing strategy for the
operator? And does a rise in revenue in case of a different pricing strategy mean
that the clients pay more individually or does it menu that the number of clients
generating revenue rises? To answer these questions, the MIP formulation (6.8) and
the branch and bound algorithm proposed were implemented and tested on several
real life instances obtained from France Telecom Research & Development. For the
tests, the operator uses one of the pricing strategies studied and not a combination
of all pricing strategies on the tariff arcs. Note furthermore that, for the pricing
strategies studied, the number of linear pieces for each pricing strategy is at most 3.
For each pricing strategy, we denote each formulation (6.8) as follows. LMIP
corresponds to a linear pricing strategy, FCMIP to a fixed charge pricing strategy,
IMMIP to an inclusive minutes pricing strategy, SCMIP to a staircase pricing strategy
and PLMIP to a piecewise linear pricing strategy on all the tariff arcs. Analogously,
we denote for each pricing strategy each branch and bound algorithm as follows.
LBB corresponds to a linear pricing strategy, FCBB to a fixed charge pricing strategy,
IMBB to an inclusive minutes pricing strategy, SCBB to a staircase pricing strategy,
and LsBB to a piecewise linear pricing strategy on all the tariff arcs.
In the remainder of this section, we first describe the data sets used, and give an
overview of the running times of each MlP formulation and branch antl bound algo-
rithm for all data sets. Subsequently, we give some interpretations of the numerical
results. All tables discussed can be found in Section 6.5.
6.4.1 Running Times
The MIP formulations using path variables and the branch and bound algorithms
described in Section 6.2.2 and Section 6.3 were implemented in C++. The path MlP
formulations and the branch and bound algorithm use the shortest path graph model
in a preprocessing phase, to generate all the relevant paths. As shown in Section 2.5,
the SPGM holds for all pricing strategies. As was noted in that section, additional112 CHAPTER 6. OPTIMIZING ALL PRICING STRATEGIES
calculation** are however necessary, since the inner graph of the SPGM is not identical
for all clients in case of non linear pricing strategies. For the shortest path graph
model, LEDA 4.1 (see LEDA [44]) was used. The path MlP formulations were solved
using CPLEX 7.5 (see CPLEX [22]). The linear programs for the lower and up-
per bound (calculations for the branch and bound algorithms were also solved using
CPLEX 7.5. The formulations were tested on the data sets described in Table 6.1.
These data sets represent telecommunications networks and are instances of inter-
connect Ions markets, as described in Section 1.2.2. For each data set, we describe
the number of nod«!s (|N|) and arcs (|A|) in the network, the number of tariff arcs
(|T|) and the number of clients (|A'|).
For Table 6.2, the column (SPGM(.I)) represents the time in seconds necessary
to generate the SPGM for all commodities, including the reduction methods, and
to find all the relevant paths in the network. The last three columns in Table 6.2
represent the minimum (MIN), maximum (MAX) and average (AVRG) number of
relevant paths generated by the SPGM. Table 6.2 shows that on average the number
of relevant paths is very low, with data set D6 having the highest number of relevant
paths on average, namely 7.4. Given this low number of paths for each data set, we
can expect the MlP formulations to perform well for all pricing strategies. For data
sets D5 and D7, the time to generate the SPGM and to find all relevant paths was
tnHJilgeSi;SiuWfy^l.\j6^ann'b!\41^
to generate all relevant paths from the shortest path graph model was substantially
loss and in the order of 1 or 2 seconds.
The time required to solve each MlP formulation can be found in Table 6.3, for all
pricing strategies. In this table, the column CP(/(s) indicates the number of seconds
to solve the corresponding Mil' formulation only. Hence, for the total execution time,
we need to add the time spent on generating all the relevant paths from the shortest
path graph model (see Table 6.2). The column Nodes gives the number of nodes
in the branch and bound tree, as reported by CPLEX. For the branch and bound
algorithms, the same information is available from Table 6.4.
Looking at the numerical results from Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, we see that the
Mil' formulations outperform the branch and bound algorithms by far for all data
sets except Dl, D2 and D3. In general, the MlP formulations perform very well on
all data sets and for all pricing strategies. The MlP formulations enable us to solve
the network tariiication problem for almost all data sets and pricing strategies in a
few seconds. The most surprising result is that the data set D5 appears to be the
most difficult one to solve. Apparently data set D5 has some other intrinsic difficulty
than the number of paths in the network, since the average number of paths found
is relatively low (lower than for either D4, D6, D7 or D8).
6.4.2 The Best Pricing Strategy
To identify the best pricing strategy for the operator of a network, consider Table 6.5,
where the exact revenue to the operator for all pricing strategies and all data sets is
stated. For convenience, the highest revenue is given in bold letters for each data set.
As we can see from Table 6.5, the revenue to the operator always rises in case of a6.4. RESULTS 113
fixed charge or piecewise linear pricing strategy. This need not be the case however
for the inclusive minutes or staircase pricing strategy-. Table 6.5 illustrates one of the
shortcomings of our MlP formulations and branch and bound algorithms, in the sense
that we do not optimize the size of each linear piece: As such, the inclusive minutes
pricing strategy is not a true generalization of the linear and fixed charge pricing
strategy, and can generate less revenue. Especially the staircase pricing strategy is
very restrictive due to the number of linear pieces and the constant tariff in each
linear piece. A staircase pricing strategy yields optimal revenues which are always
lower than all other pricing strategies, for all data sots considered. Table 6.5 shows
that the piecewise linear pricing strategy always yields the highest revenue. The
linear by segments pricing strategy contains all other pricing strategies as a special
case, even when the size of each linear piece is not optimized It thus should indeed
yield at least as high a revenue as the other pricing stategies. Besides the beat
pricing strategy, the numerical results and previous observations allow us to state
the worst pricing strategy: A staircase pricing strategy will generate less revenue to
the operator. This property could be changed by optimizing the number and the size
of the linear pieces.
6.4.3 Consequences for the Clients
Table 6.6 is useful to investigate the consequences of the choice of pricing strategy
for the clients. It shows the number of clients taking at least one tariff arc (and thus
generating revenue to the operator) for all data sets and pricing strategies. That same
number is given as a percentage of all clients in the network between parentheses.
Table 6.6 thus also gives the percentage of all clients served for all pricing strategies
and all data sets. Table 6.7 combines the information from Table 6.5 and Table 6.6
and shows the average revenue to the operator, indexed on a linear pricing strategy.
From these tables, we can see that the number of clients served stays fairly constant
for each data set, with the exception once again for the staircase pricing strategy.
The percentage of clients served varies across the different data sets from 20% of all
clients to 100%. From Table 6.5 and Table 6.7, we see that although the revenue to
the operator rises with at most 10%, when taking a fixed charge or inclusive minutes
pricing strategy instead of a linear pricing strategy, the average revenue per client
rises with at most 20% in that case. As we have seen previously from Table 6.5, the
revenue decreases significantly for a staircase pricing strategy. The average revenue
per client however, stays fairly constant for that particular pricing strategy, with the
exception of data set D3. For this data set, the average revenue per client more than
doubles when compared to the linear pricing strategy. Apparently, for this data set,
approximately half of the clients yield little revenue and are dropped for the bigger
clients when taking a staircase pricing strategy. Note that although the average
revenue per client is higher, the total revenue is however still approximately 10%
lower than for a linear pricing strategy. If we disregard the staircase pricing strategy,
then we can say that clients pay more on average for a different pricing strategy than
the linear pricing strategy. This especially holds for the fixed charge and inclusive
minutes pricing strategy.114 CHAPTER 6. OPTIMIZING ALL PRICING STRATEGIES
6.4.4 Conclusion
As we have seen in the previous section, choosing a pricing strategy is as important
as optimizing the pricing strategy: Depending on the particular market to serve, one
pricing strategy may yield more revenue than the others. From the analysis of the
numerical nwults we can conclude that the piecewise linear pricing strategy yields the
highest revenue. We can furthermore conclude from Section 6.4.2 that the staircase
pricing strategy is very restrictive and yields, on average, less revenue to the leader
than the other pricing strategies for the test instances considered. For most data
Bets studied, the staircase pricing strategy furthermore perturbed the solution much
more when compared to the other pricing strategies: the average revenue per client
and the percentage of clients served may differ very much.
Although we studied the best pricing strategy from a revenue point of view, the
choice of a pricing strategy by a telecommunications operator may not only depend
on the revenue, but also on the transparency for the user: Although a piecewise
linear pricing strategy yields more revenue to the operator, an inclusive minutes
pricing strategy is easier to understand. As such, further research could study the
optimization of the size of each linear piece for a particular pricing strategy. Another
interesting asp«-ct would be to study the optimization of the number of such linear
pieces. Kspecially for a staircase pricing strategy, this could be benificial to the
operator. Such'research'would however need a ditterent optimization model than the
one given here.6.5. TABLES j>,' u
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In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 we introduce the network tarifuation problem (N'l'P).
A remodeling of the network is proposed which tries to focus on the combinatorial
structure of the problem: the shortest path graph model (SPGM). Besides provid-
ing additional insight into the network tarification problem, the shortest path graph
model is used in later chapters to solve the network tarification problem to opti-
mality. The shortest path graph model prompted a patent application by Prance
Telecom, which was granted by the 7ns<i£u< Mzteona/ de /a Propri^<e /nrfu.s<rie//r in
Paris, France on August 15th, 2003 (see [9]) and by the Wor/d /n«c//ec«ua/ Property
Organization on August 21st, 2003 (see [8]).
The complexity of the network tarification problem is studied in Chapter 3. The
network tarification problem is shown to be NT-hard, using a proof by Roch et al. [53].
We show that two special cases of the network tarification problem, the river tarifica-
tion problem and the all-service network tarification problem, remain NT-hard. We
identify several new polynomially solvable special cases. One of the new special cases
introduced is the bounded arcs linear tarification problem. For this special case, we
are dealing with a linear pricing strategy on the tariff arcs, where the number of tariff
arcs is bounded a priori. Another important special case is the parametric tarification
problem, where the pricing strategy on the tariff arcs is dependent on a single pa-
rameterized tariff only. Parametric tarification itself has an interesting special case,
uniform tarification. As shown in Chapter 4, a chapter dedicated to approximation
results, uniform tarification allows for a |T|-approximation algorithm for the river
tarification problem with a linear pricing strategy on the tariff arcs, where |T| is the
number of tariff arcs in the network. Whenever the costs on the fixed cost arcs in
the network are polynomially bounded in terms of |T|, we can improve this bound
and show that uniform tarification provides an 0(log(|T|))-approximation. In Chap-
ter 4, we show that the all-service network tarification problem is inapproximable
with Ofllf "') and with O(|AT|'^~'), unless ZT? =
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An intenttting avenue for further research would be to extend the class of poly-
nomially solvable cast* even further. One special case which could be interesting
and extends the research presented is to bound the number of commodities a priori.
Furthermore, the complexity of the network tarification problem with a non linear
pricing strategy and multiple tariff arcs, where the number of tariff arcs is upper
bounded a priori is unknown. It remains open at this point if there exists a bet-
ter approximation result for the river tarification problem or if we can extend our
result to the network tarification problem with multiple clients. It is furthermore
unknown at this point if the network tarification problem is inapproximable without
the all-service assumption.
In Chapter 5 we consider exact methods for the optimization of the network
tarification problem for a linear pricing strategy on the tariff arcs. To this end,
several mixed integer programming (MlP) formulations and a branch and bound
algorithm are proposed. Although, as shown in Chapter 2, the upper bound on the
number of undominated patlis can be reached for artificial instances, the numerical
results show the strength of the shortest path graph model for the instances tested:
On average only a small number of relevant (undominated) paths are generated by
the shortest path graph model. The strength of the shortest path graph model is
furthermore shown by an existing arc formulation of the problem that benefits from
the remodeling of the network. The MlP formulations and the branch and bound
algorithm proposed in Chapter 5 are generalized for all pricing strategies studied in
Chapter 6. The impact of each pricing strategy on the revenue for the leader and
the consequences for the clients is investigated, using the numerical results on a set
of real life instances.
It is shown in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 that the shortest path graph model is
very helpful in remodeling the network and that formulations based on this remod-
eled network are very efficient. As a possible future extension, the paths generated
by the shortest path graph model could be used in other models based on a path
formulation of the network tarification problem. Recently, Didi et al. [26] have pro-
posed a new MlP formulation using path variables and a new MlP formulation using
a combination of arc and path variables for the network tarification problem with
linear pricing strategies. These new formulations have not been implemented and
tested, but it would be interesting to see how they compare to the path formulation
proposed. Another extension would be to consider the network tarification problem
with capacities on the arcs. Finally, the optimization of the size and number of linear
pieces in a pricing strategy could be an interesting avenue for further research.Bibliography
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71130Samenvatting
In hoofdstuk 1 en 2 van dit proetschrift introdueeren we een priishopnJinesprobleom,
het zogenaamde neiuioril' lan/tcatiori proUcm. Voor dit prijslM-p.tlm^piolili-im is tvn
netwerk gegeven met daarin een aantal kanten waarvoor de prjjs al Iwkend is on
een aantal kanten waarvoor dit niot het geval is. De prij.s op dt>/,<> liuitslncnooimlc
kanten, de tariefkanten. inoet nog nader ix-jwiaJd worden. Kluutcn in hot network
willen hun data van een punt in het netwerk naar een ander punt krijgi'ii, togen de
goedkoopst mogelijke prijs. De prijzon op de tariefkanten worden do<n <!* .i.mliicilor
van capaciteit in het netwerk echter op tie wiu.st!naxiiiutli.s<>rende prij* f,<v<-i
Een hermodellering van het netwerk wordt besproken, welke zich beperkt tot de
combinatorische structuur van het probleem: het s/ior<f>.s< p«//i <7rap/i rrimfr/. Naast
het geven van meer inzicht in de structuur van het network, wordt doze hennodelleririR
in latere hoofdstukken gebruikt om het prijsbepalingsprobloem optimaal op te loss<>n.
FVance Telecom deed een patentaanvraag voor deze hermodellering, welke door hot
7ns<t<«< ]Va<tona/ de /a Pnoprt^c /ndu,s<rie/Zf in Parijs, FVankrijk, word toogekend op
15 augustus 2003 (zie [9]) en door de WorW /n<e//ec<ua/ /"nopcrtj/ Oryanuahwn op 21
augustus 2003 (zie [8]).
De complexiteit van het prijsbepalingsprobleem wordt goanalyseerd in hoofdstuk
3. Aan de hand van het bewijs van Roch et al. [53] wordt aangetoorul dat het
probleem MT-moeilijk is. We bewijzen dat twee speciale gevallen van hot probleom
DsfT-moeilijk blijven en bespreken verschillende nieuwe polynorniaal oplosbaro proble-
men. Een van de speciale gevallen die polynomiaal oplosbaar zijn, is hot i>rijsbepa-
lingsprobleem met een lineaire prijsstrategie op de tariefkanten waarvoor hot aantal
tariefkanten in het netwerk begrensd is. Een ander speciaal geval is het prijsbepa-
lingsprobleem met een parametrische prijsstrategie op de tariefkanten.
In hoofdstuk 4, een hoofdstuk gewijd aan approximatieresultaten, wordt bespro-
ken dat uniforme prijsbepaling een |T|-benaderingsalgoritme levert voor het speciale
geval van het prijsbepalingsprobleem waar de tariefkanten zich in een snede bevin-
den (het aantal tariefkanten is gelijk aan |T|). Wanneer de kosten op de vaste kosten
kanten in het netwerk polynomiaal begrensd zijn in |7"|, kunnen we het algoritme
verbeteren tot een 0(log(|T|))-benaderingsalgoritme. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt verder
bewezen dat wanneer alle klanten in het netwerk bediend moeten worden (het aan-
tal klanten is gelijk aan |A"|), het prijsbepalingsprobleem niet benaderbaar is met
0(|T|'-') of met G(|ff|'/*-'), tenzij Z0>0> =
131132
De compiexiteit van het prijsbepalingsprobleem met een niet-lineaire prijsstrate-
gie en meerdere tariefkanten, waarbij het aantal tariefkanten begrensd is, Ls op dit
moment onbekend. Het Ls verder op dit moment nog onbekend of er betere benade-
ringsalgoritmen zijn voor het speciale geval van het prijsbepalingsprobleem waar de
tariefkanten zich in een snede bevinden en of we de resultaten voor dit speciale geval
kunnen overbrengen naar het prijsbepalingsprobleem met meerdere klanten. Verder
is het op dit moment nog onbekend of het prijsbepalingsprobleem niet te benaderen
in wanneer niet alle klanten bediend hoeven te worden.
In hoofdstuk 5 bespreken we exacte oplossingsmethoden voor het prijsbepalings-
probleem met een lineaire prijsstrategie op de tariefkanten. Hoewel, zoaLs in hoofd-
Btuk 2 b«*sprokrn, de bovengrens op hot aantal ongedomineerde paden van een klant
gehaald kiui worden voor kuiLstnmtige instanties, laten de rekenresultaten de kracht
van de hermodellering van het netwerk zien op de geteste instanties: over het alge-
meeri wordt niaar eeii klein aantal ongedomineerde paden gegenereerd aan de hand
van de hermodellering. In hoofdstuk 6 worden de exacte oplossingsmethoden van
hoofdstuk 5 gegeneraliseerd naar alle prijsstrategieen. Het gevolg van het gebruik van
elke prijsst.rategie op de opbrengst. voor de aanbieder van capariteit in het. netwerk en
op de kosten voor de klanten wordt onderzocht, aan de hand van een aantal instanties
van FYance Telecom.
Iliinfilstnk T. mi linnfdslnV fi lnton '/i»>n Hot H*» h*>rmr>Hpllpriijj» van hpt nptwrprV
gocde rttsultaten levert en dat formuleringen, gebaseerd op deze hermodellering erg
efficient zijn. In verder onderzoek zou deze hermodellering kunnen worden toegepast
op andere formuleringen van het prijsbepalingsprobleem. In recentelijk onderzoek
van Didi et al. [26) wordt een aantal nieuwe formuleringen hiervoor besproken. Deze
formuleringen werden niet geimplementeerd en getest, niaar het zou interessant zijn
om /.<• te vergelijk«Mi met de huidige oplossingsmethoden. Toekomstig onderzoek zou
zich kunnen richten op het prijsbepalingsprobleem met capaciteiten op de kanten in
het netwerk of op de optimalisatie van de grootte van de lineaire stukken en van het
aantal lineaire stukken in een prijsstrategie.About the Author
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